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Proof and Progress: Coping with the Law of
Evidence in a Technological Age
David M. Paciocco*
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND THE GUIDING
PRINCIPLES
The law of evidence was not designed to deal with new technologies. Its rules
and principles were born in simpler times when the primary source of information
was human memory of events communicated orally by God-fearing witnesses, and
where copies of documents were penned by hand, commonly using quills. We are
now trying to use the “modern issue” of these same rules and principles in a world
where a telephone provides instant access to a library of information; where that
phone can work like an ankle bracelet tracking the movements of its carrier; where
records are stored not just on computers but in clouds; and data is transmitted in-
stantaneously using invisible signals. It is not surprising that this causes enough
disquiet to inspire judges to dedicate conferences to the problem of coping with
new technology. It is important, however, to gain insight into why technologies
rightfully make us uncomfortable enough to feel the need for retraining.
This insecurity exists not because the law of evidence is out-dated or difficult
to apply to new technologies. The root of our insecurity is that many of us do not
understand information technology, yet it is necessary to understand information
technology to apply the law of evidence in an intelligent manner. The reason many
of us do not understand information technology is that it takes many years to be-
come jurists and even longer to become judges. This, of course, is my polite and
indirect way of admitting that most judges are old enough to think that information
technology is new and mysterious. We never trained the muscles in our thumbs to
type 70 words a minute, we do not think in Boolean logic, and we simply cannot
relate to the openness of younger generations who are prepared to post their most
intimate and personal moments on social media and tweet their every move. Most
of us still crave the musty smell of law books in libraries and some of the more
eccentric among us miss leafing through citators — okay, at least one of us does.
My point is that it is the technology and the brave new world that we do not under-
stand. There is nothing in the law of evidence arising from these new technologies
that should scare us.
I make this point not only to give some comfort to those of us who need to
know the law and who already struggle with complex rules of proof. I make this
point to underline that the challenge is not primarily to learn more law or new law,
although there is some of that. What has to be learned are the functions and basic
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operations of new technologies and the cultural changes that technological develop-
ments have inspired. A decade ago in R. v. Rose Fraser-Martin J. gently chided
defence counsel who demanded hard copy disclosure because he was not computer
literate.1 The judge, with typical judicial understatement, said “it is probably now
incumbent on those of us who are of a somewhat older generation to get with the
program.” He noted by way of example that the Statutes of Canada are no longer
published in hard copy, and he called this “progress.” His point, of course, is that
those who will not learn will be left behind. Information is the stock and trade of
the business of law and information technology is ubiquitous. Electronic filing is
becoming a mundane requirement for lawyers. And yellow pads are no match for
iPads as court tools. As a result, law societies now recognize it to be a professional
obligation to stay sufficiently attuned with new technologies to be able to serve the
needs of clients in an electronic world.
The same ethical obligation applies, no doubt, with equal intensity to profes-
sional judges. We don’t have to post pictures of our drunken revelry on social me-
dia to “get with the program” but we do need to know what “social media,” includ-
ing Facebook, is, and how it works. We need to know that Twitter is not one of the
seven dwarves. We need to accept that our phones are smarter than we are and we
need to know why. And we need to know when we are posting information on a
cloud, and what that entails. If we do not, we will not have the context and compre-
hension required to cope.
The second reason why it is important to appreciate that the real challenge lies
in our lack of familiarity with new technology is that, if the state of the law is
blamed, the law will be vulnerable to unnecessary reform which can only increase
its complexity. Our rules and principles of evidence do not have to be retooled to
cope with this brave new world. With rare exception, most evidentiary rules and
principles apply the same way to new technology as they did in simpler times. This
is because it is not information that has changed. The change that has occurred
through new technologies is in the mode of delivery of information, and its ease of
access.
The only rules that needed recalibration to deal with this relate to mundane
matters such as authentication and the antiquated “best evidence” rule, a rule that
had already lost its teeth more than 50 years ago with the advent of the Gestetner.
As will be explained, the approach to expert evidence has also been modestly re-
vised in Ontario to ensure that evidence generated using new technologies is acces-
sible and efficiently received. It is also possible that changes to our social concep-
tion of privacy wrought by the ubiquity of information technology will impact on
the law of privilege and the ultimate admissibility of seized information. Beyond
this our base rules and principles relating to things such as judicial notice, hearsay,
character, and judicial discretion require no refinement. They are fine the way they
are. The law of evidence as we know it can be invoked to cope with technological
evidence without the need for reconstructive surgery.
This is not to say that evidentiary rules and principles do not have to be ap-
plied in an accommodating way. If a rigid and narrow approach were to be taken it
1 R. v. Rose, [2002] Q.J. No. 8339, 2002 CarswellQue 2936 (Que. S.C.); leave to appeal
refused 2003 CarswellQue 67 (S.C.C.).
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could result in the exclusion of much information created with or collected by new
technology. As absurd as it now sounds, for years we debated whether photographs
and video-recordings were evidence, trying to treat them as if they were visual aids
to assist testimony. We now accept, with good reason, that photographs and video-
recordings can be used as “silent witnesses” in preference to testimony.2 When we
started storing data on computers some courts initially rejected computerized docu-
ments, being intimidated by continuity concerns and feeling insecure about what
computer generated thing would constitute the “original” record. Would it be a
print out, or must it be a copied file, or the hard drive? For a time we feared the use
of technology by lawyers in court to display information, even though PowerPoint
and computer generated documents can aid in the presentation and comprehension
of a case. The point is that fear of what is new cannot be allowed to impede the
incorporation of newer technologies. After all, law is a practical discipline and it
functions in the real world. It would be unrealistic to reject electronic documents
and emails, notwithstanding realistic fears of ease of manipulation. Similarly it
would be unrealistic to deny privilege because of concerns arising from the insecu-
rity of data storage. And, as already intimated, it will become unrealistic in the long
run to stick to rigid and narrow ideas about expectations of privacy when dealing
with information pirated from social media.3 We need to leave our rules and princi-
ples open enough to accommodate new technologies and the culture they bring
about, lest the law of evidence become irrelevant. To achieve this we will, for ex-
ample, have to find comfort in weighing rather than excluding evidence to cope
with continuity concerns. We will also have to take a functional approach to judi-
cial notice and expert evidence lest our trials get bogged down or defeated by insis-
tence, where it is not truly required, that technological experts testify. Ultimately
the law of evidence is a tool-kit used in a practical enterprise — the resolution of
conflicts through adjudication. It has to operate in the real world as it is, not as it
was. We will make it fit because we must, but take heart in knowing that the
changes required are modest at best and few are conceptual or elusive.
This article outlines those rules of evidence that are most likely to be called
upon to fit new technologies. It identifies some of the challenges that are presented,
and identifies modest techniques or suggestions for coping. Those suggestions in-
clude taking the kind of relaxed view as to when expert evidence is being offered
illustrated by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Hamilton;4 taking a functional
approach to judicial notice; ensuring that authentication and the “best evidence”
rule for electronic records are not applied in a highly technical fashion; understand-
ing the law of hearsay and remaining familiar with key hearsay exceptions; apply-
2 See R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197, 1996 CarswellOnt 4425, 1996 CarswellOnt
4426 (S.C.C.).
3 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. .........., 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) (Slip Opinion per
Sotomayor, J., concurring).
4 See R. v. Hamilton, [2011] O.J. No. 2306, 2011 CarswellOnt 3491 (Ont. C.A.); leave to
appeal refused 2012 CarswellOnt 10888, 2012 CarswellOnt 10889 (S.C.C.); leave to
appeal refused 2012 CarswellOnt 10890, 2012 CarswellOnt 10891 (S.C.C.); leave to
appeal refused 2012 CarswellOnt 10921, 2012 CarswellOnt 10920 (S.C.C.); leave to
appeal refused 2012 CarswellOnt 10892, 2012 CarswellOnt 10893 (S.C.C.)
[Hamilton].
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ing the law of privilege in ways that reflect the new realities that compromise pri-
vacy; understanding the limits of character evidence and the opportunities for the
exclusionary discretion; and recognizing the utility in the technological presenta-
tion of evidence.
I. ADAPTING THE LAW TO NEW TECHNOLOGIES: THE MOST
AFFECTED RULES
(a) Expert Evidence and Testimony by those with Special Knowledge
Put in its simplest terms, “expert evidence” is offered by those who are
trained, to those who are not. As a result, the more training that occurs in our soci-
ety, the greater that the opportunities for expert evidence become. And so it is with
technology. The increase in learning that accompanies technological innovation in-
creases the amount of expert evidence that will be offered in the courts.
Without question technological advances have enriched the pool of helpful in-
formation. Most notably, new forms of “technological forensic evidence” are being
offered by experts. DNA evidence is the most important example, but there are a
wide range of analytical and diagnostic techniques that are now being employed to
resolve cases. And the ground is still breaking. For example, phylogenetic testing to
determine “evolutionary distance” was admitted in the HIV infection case of R. v.
Aziga5 as circumstantial evidence linking Aziga to the infection of complainants. In
R. v. Tremble “real time PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction DNA,” a new form of
DNA testing, was offered but rejected as its reliability was inadequately demon-
strated.6 Motor vehicle EDT (Electric Data Recorder) or “black box” evidence is
commonly presented in motor vehicle cases.7 Meanwhile, computers can be used
by persons with expertise to generate demonstrative evidence,8 including computer
animations that go well beyond the charts and graphs once relied upon, and enrich
the trial process.
Then there is “computer by-product evidence.” The simple use of computers
and similar devices generates a treasure trove of forensically useful information
that can be offered to courts by persons with special knowledge. Those with train-
ing can use coded Internet Service Provider information to identify the computers
another computer has communicated with. The origin of websites that have been
visited can be traced. The date computer documents were created or modified can
5 R. v. Aziga, [2008] O.J. No. 5131, 2008 CarswellOnt 7630 (Ont. S.C.J.)
6 R. v. Tremble, [2010] O.J. No. 5957, 2010 CarswellOnt 11085 (Ont. S.C.J.); additional
reasons 2010 CarswellOnt 4071 (Ont. S.C.J.)
7 See, for example, R. v. Delorey, [2012] N.S.J. No. 90, 2012 CarswellNS 122 (N.S.
C.A.)
8 See, for example, R. v. Suzack, [1995] O.J. No. 4237, 1995 CarswellOnt 1350 (Ont.
Gen. Div.); affirmed 2000 CarswellOnt 95 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused 2001
CarswellOnt 1076, 2001 CarswellOnt 1075 (S.C.C.); R. v. Scotland, [2007] O.J. No.
5305, 2007 CarswellOnt 8877 (Ont. S.C.J.).
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE   185
be determined, and so can the last time the computer was logged into or shut
down.9 Information hidden or previously deleted can often be resurrected.10
Of course it is a good thing when expertise improves knowledge and therefore
the accuracy of fact-finding. Yet expert evidence comes with a price. It is typically
time-consuming, raising trial efficiency and cost issues. It is most often expensive,
raising important access to evidence issues. Expert evidence is also capable of dis-
torting outcomes. Expert evidence is not always accurate evidence, but it is difficult
to challenge and assess given its technicality and the daunting credentials of many
expert witnesses.
It is important, for these reasons, that expert evidence and expert evidence
rules be neither underused, nor overused. Most attention has been given in the law
of evidence of late to preventing its overuse. Judges have been cautioned repeatedly
to be vigilant gatekeepers11 to prevent unreliable, unnecessary, or prejudicial expert
evidence from being admitted.12 Yet judges also need to avoid complicating trials
with unnecessary and unhelpful Mohan admissibility voir dires.13 It is not an easy
matter to achieve an appropriate balance. As always, practical thinking can guide
the way.
To assist in this exercise it is helpful to recognize that technological informa-
tion comes in different forms. It includes not only the “technical forensic evidence”
and “computer by-product evidence” I have described. There is also what I call
“mundane technology evidence.”14 “Mundane technologies” are the day-to-day
uses to which information technology is put. It includes the use of social media
such as Facebook and Twitter; the operation of search engines to retrieve data; the
operation of computers, tablets, and smart phones; and the use of digitized technol-
ogy to take and edit photographs, digitized movies, and audio-recorded informa-
tion, including computer stored 911 calls. These are things that require special
training to use or understand, yet they are not the stuff of expert evidence. No
Mohan vetting is required before testimony about their use or operation is offered.
For example, no expertise is required to explain Facebook to a judge, including
how it works or how access is granted, or how messages are posted, sent, or re-
9 See, for example, R. v. Winchester, 2010 CarswellOnt 397, [2010] O.J. No. 693 (Ont.
S.C.J.).
10 See, for example, R. v. Bishop, 2007 ONCJ 441, 2007 CarswellOnt 6385 (Ont. C.J).
11 R. c. J. (J.-L.), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, 2000 CarswellQue 2310, 2000 CarswellQue 2311
(S.C.C.), at para. 28.
12 This trend began, of course, in the leading decision in R. v. Mohan, 1994 CarswellOnt
66, 1994 CarswellOnt 1155, 29 C.R. (4th) 243 (S.C.C.) [Mohan].
13 In R. v. Abbey, [2009] O.J. No. 3534, 2009 CarswellOnt 5008 (Ont. C.A.); leave to
appeal refused 2010 CarswellOnt 4828, 2010 CarswellOnt 4827 (S.C.C.) an improved
analytical structure was developed for Mohan expert evidence voir dires that involves
exploring whether four straight forward prerequisites are satisfied before balancing the
costs and benefits of admission. For a more complete discussion see David M Paciocco
& Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence (6th ed), (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 193–201
[Paciocco & Stuesser, The Law of Evidence].
14 I am not suggesting there is a legal rule that uses this structure or that there should be. I
am offering a heuristic or model for making sense of the role of expert evidence and
technology.
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ceived. Any witness who uses Facebook can offer this information. Similarly,
iPhone users can explain what “apps” are and what use they make of them, without
furnishing expert evidence. Ultimately courts requiring help in understanding
“mundane technologies” can rely on ordinary members of the public to describe
those uses that ordinary members of the public make of the technology in question.
It is only when subjects move into the more rarified and technical questions, such
as what time and date stamps attached to messages signify, that ordinary witnesses
are not apt to have the expertise to assist.
It can be protested that individuals who acquire knowledge that is held solely
by those who are users of technology are in some sense “experts” because what
separates expert witnesses from lay witnesses is “special skill or knowledge,”
whether acquired through formal training or not.15 Yet those who understand and
use mundane technologies are not expert in any real sense. “Experts” are those with
“special” skill or knowledge. The “special” qualification connotes exclusivity or
uniqueness. The ability to understand and use commonplace technology is not spe-
cial. Moreover, experts possess skill or knowledge “beyond the ken of ordinary
people.”16 The simple fact that many will not have knowledge or skill does not put
it beyond the ken of ordinary people. The ordinary person, like the reasonable per-
son, is a fictitious objective measure. And like the reasonable person, the ordinary
person is not found at the ends of the spectrum. Ordinary persons are a composite
of people generally, including those with easily acquired skills and knowledge,
even when not possessed by others.
In spite of this there is an understandable but unfortunate tendency to engage
the expert evidence rules and conduct a voir dire whenever anyone sets about to
explain anything that not everyone will know. In R. v. Pelich17 for example, a
Mohan expertise voir dire was conducted to determine whether a police officer
working in the child pornography section could explain how “LimeWire” peer-to-
peer file sharing worked. “LimeWire” is widely available software designed to be
accessible to computer users and arguably did not require expertise to explain. Sim-
ilarly, in R. v. Pasqua18 an expert evidence voir dire was held before allowing
computer enhanced photos to be presented. The officer who did the enhancement
was not purporting to identify a doctored photo or video, something that would
truly have required expertise. He had used software to improve security images,
software that employed the same technology that is available commercially and
15 See Mohan, supra note 12. In R. v. O. (N.), [2009] A.J. No. 213, 2009 CarswellAlta
288 (Alta. C.A.), for example, the Alberta Court of Appeal commented that “The des-
ignation of expert is a modest status that is achieved when a witness possesses special
knowledge going beyond that of the trier of fact [in the subject of the proposed
testimony].”
16 See, for example, R. v. Sekhon, 2012 BCCA 512, 2012 CarswellBC 4005 (B.C. C.A.)
and R. v. Lewis, 2012 ONCA 388, 2012 CarswellOnt 7105 (Ont. C.A.) as contempo-
rary examples of where the “beyond the ken of ordinary” people standard is applied.
See R. v. Currie (2002), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 190, 2002 CarswellOnt 1841 (Ont. C.A.) at
para. 67, ; leave to appeal refused 2004 CarswellOnt 440, 2004 CarswellOnt 439
(S.C.C.) for a general discussion of when expert evidence may be necessary.
17 R. v. Pelich, 2012 CarswellOnt 6875, [2012] O.J. No. 2467 (Ont. S.C.J.).
18 R. v. Pasqua, 2008 CarswellAlta 221, [2008] A.J. No. 184 (Alta. Q.B.).
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which requires no specialized knowledge or training to utilize. Arguably no expert
evidence was at stake in what he was offering.
The concern for overuse of Mohan voir dires where technological evidence is
offered is not just a question of efficiency. It is also a question of credibility. The
repute of the administration of justice could not endure, in this modern age, courts
that refuse to recognize and utilize technologies that are widespread and mundane.
Risking exclusion by conducting Mohan voir dires, or setting up appeal opportuni-
ties by requiring them to be had is contrary to the public interest. Courts must con-
duct their business effectively and realistically.
This kind of practical thinking appears to have inspired the Ontario Court of
Appeal in R. v. Hamilton.19 The trial judge permitted representatives of cellphone
service providers to testify and use cellphone tower records to triangulate the loca-
tion of particular cellphones at the time of a shooting. These witnesses explained
the technical principles that operate to route cellphone calls to particular towers20
and interpreted computerized records to permit the triangulation. The Crown had
sought to qualify the representatives as experts to give this evidence but the trial
judge admitted the evidence without a Mohan inquiry. The Ontario Court of Appeal
upheld that decision, saying: 
Even if evidence about the general rule [that cell phones use the closest
tower] and its exceptions could at one time have been considered opinion
evidence, it is now simply factual evidence that witnesses with the knowl-
edge and experience . . . can testify about. [These witnesses] were not
proferring a novel scientific or behavioural theory that was open to debate.
They were testifying about uncontroversial facts related to the operation of
cell phone networks.21
The significance of the Hamilton decision is unclear. It is unlikely that the
Court intended to reserve expert evidence scrutiny solely for cases where overt
“opinions” are offered, regardless of the special training it may take to make and
offer relevant factual observations. It is doubtful, for example, that a lay witness
could qualify to describe the algorithms used in a computer program, even if no
expression of opinion is involved.22 Nor is it likely that the Court intended to con-
fine the application of the expert evidence rule to “novel scientific or behavioural
theory.” Established rules of expert evidence apply to all evidence that requires
19 Hamilton, supra note 4.
20 These witnesses were allowed to explain the basic principle that an operating cell
phone will register at the tower with the strongest signal, which will be the closest
tower, unless: (1) the closest tower is at capacity; (2) there is a body of water between
the cell phone and the closest tower; or (3) there is a large obstruction such as multi-
story building between the cell phone and the closest tower, in which case a more
distant tower with an unobstructed line of sight or a flat path of elevation may end up
serving the cell phone.
21 Hamilton, supra note 4 at para. 279.
22 The inaptly named “expert opinion evidence” rule has long been applied to factual
observations both because the line between fact and opinion is unreliable, and because
there are factual observations that require special skill and knowledge to understand,
observe, and explain, raising most of the risks that expressions of expert opinion
present.
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special education or training that goes beyond the ken of ordinary persons, with
more intense application in the case of “novel scientific or behavioural theory.”23 It
is best to read Hamilton as holding that a full-bore Mohan voir dire may not be
required where the kind of evidence in question is familiar to courts, where it is
presented as circumstantial evidence rather than as a direct opinion on an issue to
be decided, and where it is based on uncontroversial principles that can be easily
understood. The subsequent decision in R. v. Cyr,24 again dealing with “cellphone
propagation maps” that merely plot the locations from which calls could have been
made, endorsed the Hamilton approach but confined its application. On the facts,
the decision to admit the evidence without a voir dire was upheld in large measure
because the trial judge addressed an issue of unreliability arising from an error rate
as high as 40% by assessing whether the evidence was probative enough to admit,
the same kind of inquiry that Mohan would have required. Justice Watt also quali-
fied Hamilton by noting that “More precise evidence may require expert
opinion.”25
The Hamilton/Cyr rationale may press the edges of the traditional law of ex-
pert evidence, but the cases are poignant examples of what can be expected in mat-
ters of technology. Courts will accommodate it unless there are real concerns about
its reliability, and they will be practical in the approach that is taken.
Even when a Mohan voir dire is truly needed, it is important to conduct it
efficiently There is no need for court after court to plow the same ground. A thresh-
old reliability inquiry, for example, need only be conducted where scientific or
technological technique is still novel as a form of evidence before Canadian courts,
or the party opposing admission provides a foundation for casting the reliability of
the evidence into question.26 Absent this, a court can take its cue from prior deci-
sions and treat technological evidence that is becoming familiar before courts as
sufficiently reliable to admit.
(b) Judicial Notice
Judicial notice, in my view, plays a central role in coping with new technol-
ogy. Given the distrust many jurists have of judicial notice, a concise overview of
judicial notice doctrines is warranted before the use of judicial notice in a techno-
logical world is explored directly.
Judicial notice occurs, of course, where a court relies on a fact that has not
been proved through evidence. It is a functional doctrine designed to promote an
efficient and sensible trial process. If a fact is notorious and incontrovertible there
is no point in requiring it to be proved. The doctrine of judicial notice can also
23 Mohan, supra note 12.
24 R. v. Cyr, 2012 CarswellOnt 16386, [2012] O.J. No. 6148 (Ont. C.A.).
25 Ibid.
26 R. v. Trochym, 2007 CarswellOnt 400, 2007 CarswellOnt 401, 43 C.R. (6th) 217
(S.C.C.) at para. 31. “Novel evidence” has still not been authoritatively defined. The
best approach is to treat evidence as novel, not when it derives from a new theory or
technique within the profession, but where it is novel as a form of evidence before the
courts. See Paciocco & Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, supra note 13 at 207–209 for a
more complete discussion.
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enhance the accuracy of trial outcomes. If a court could not rely on a notorious and
incontrovertible material fact because it had not been proved, verdicts would not
conform to reality. The repute of the administration of justice would be harmed.
In spite of its importance, the problem with judicial notice is that it is antitheti-
cal to the adversarial theory of litigation in which the parties bring forward the
proof. Jurists are trained to let the parties control the record and are therefore suspi-
cious of judicial notice. They tend to believe that judicial notice is rarely taken. In
fact it is constantly taken.27 No item of circumstantial evidence could be used un-
less jurists drew inferences from that evidence based on their understanding of un-
proved facts — things such as human behaviour, the observable and broadly under-
stood laws of physics, and the functioning of the human organism. Judicial notice is
taken repeatedly not only when drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence
but also when understanding direct evidence. For example when someone describes
putting the brakes on in a car no-one offers expert testimony that the function of
brakes is to slow or stop vehicles, that brakes are typically controlled by foot-ped-
als that are depressed in order to slow or stop the vehicle, or that brakes are de-
pressed gently to come to a gradual stop and aggressively for an emergency stop.
The judge can picture the braking event testified to and understand its significance
only by putting it into the context of relevant information not proved in evidence
but which the judge and everyone else would readily know. Many facts not proved
in evidence but required to understand those facts that have been proved in evi-
dence enter the picture in this way, often almost subconsciously, and they are used
in resolving cases.
No-one should therefore be afraid of judicial notice. Without it, the process
would not function. The only caveats are related to the need for judges to respect
the adversarial system and the need to maintain the appearance of justice.
First, judges should take judicial notice only of those facts and propositions of
fact that are beyond reasonable controversy.28 That way everyone will understand
why proof has been dispensed with and no party can complain that the facts in
question should have been the subject of adversarial debate.
Moreover, judges should take judicial notice only of facts that are “notori-
ous.”29 The concern is that if a judge initiates information about facts and proposi-
tions that impact an outcome and the result favours one of the parties, the judge
will appear to be biased. No reasonable apprehension of bias occurs, however, if
those facts and propositions are so widely known that observers would accept them
to be true beyond reasonable dispute. In such cases reasonable observers would
understand why an adversarial contest was not invited.
Yet the reality is that levels of knowledge vary within a community, as does
the degree of interest taken about court proceedings. So the law must be sensible. If
something is broadly known that will be enough, even if it is not universally
27 I discuss the reality that judicial notice is commonly taken in “The Promise of R.D.S.:
Integrating the Law of Judicial Notice and the Apprehension of Bias” (1998) 3 Can
Crim L Rev 319 at 326–328.
28 R. v. Spence, 2005 SCC 71, 2005 CarswellOnt 6824, 2005 CarswellOnt 6825 (S.C.C.)
[Spence].
29 Ibid.
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known. It is also acceptable if the fact or proposition is confirmed in commonly
consulted sources that are trusted to be accurate.30
Finally, judicial notice operates on a sliding scale. It has to in order to func-
tion. The more central the matter judicially noted is, the stricter the requirements of
“indisputability” and “notoriety.”31 The requirements are strict when it comes to
centrally important facts that impact on the ultimate findings of fact in the case.32
When it comes to more peripheral matters such as the propositions required in or-
der to understand and to draw inferences from evidence that has been led, the stan-
dards are not exacting.33
Without generous reliance on judicial notice the sensible resolution of disputes
would be impaired, adversarial principles notwithstanding. It would also make it
next to impossible for courts to adapt to new technologies. It is important to bear in
mind that if judges cannot use judicial notice to work with evidence produced by
new technology, it may become necessary to call expert witnesses to assist, which
impedes the efficient and cost-effective administration of justice.
That is why I have concerns about broad statements made in pockets of Cana-
dian case law that “courts cannot take judicial notice of functioning of machines.”34
While there are functions that machines perform that certainly do require expert
evidence, courts take judicial notice of the functioning of machines routinely. Take
the telephone for example. No-one would think it necessary to call evidence about
the functioning of a telephone. Everyone understands that individuals have as-
signed telephone numbers that are exclusive to them, that telephones are dialled to
30 A lesser known foundation for notoriety was endorsed in R. v. Cobham, [1994] 3
S.C.R. 360, 1994 CarswellAlta 748, 1994 CarswellAlta 326 (S.C.C.). The Court said
that the availability of duty counsel was so notorious among criminal lawyers and
judges that Cobham did not have to lead evidence of its availability in order to main-
tain a Charter challenge based on the failure of the police to notify him of the availabil-
ity of free immediate legal assistance. The unspoken theory has to be that what is
widely known in the justice system is information that can readily be known by mem-
bers of the public with an interest in the matter. Canadian courts have been reluctant to
use this authority.
31 Spence, supra note 28 at para. 60.
32 Ibid. at para. 62.
33 It is similar thinking that makes me feel liberated enough to rely in this paper on
“Wikipedia” as authority for mundane explanations about basic matters such as the
functioning of telephones, and the difference between analog and digital transmission.
While it would be more perilous to consult Wikipedia on politically charged or esoteric
matters, it is a convenient, readily accessible, and reliable enough source to warrant
using for secondary or illustrative purposes.
34 See R. v. Newton (August 30, 1996), [1996] O.J. No. 5360, Flaherty Prov. J. (Ont.
Prov. Div.) and R. v. McCoy (December 3, 2004), [2004] O.J. No. 6224, F.L. Forsyth J.
(Ont. C.J.). I want to thank Aaron A Fox, QC, for drawing these and some of the other
cases referred to in this section to my attention. The Newton and McCoy decisions are
no doubt correct because they dealt with the synchronization of red and green lights in
the particular traffic lights in question. The issue I have is with the overbreadth of the
courts’ suggestion that “the functioning of machines” is taboo when it comes to judicial
notice.
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make contact, and that they need to be answered either manually or mechanically
for that contact to occur. When we accept the testimony of a witness that they were
speaking to a particular individual by telephone we rely on our knowledge that
voices can be transmitted by telephone instantaneously or with only immaterial de-
lay. And if a witness testifies that they observed the caller’s number on their phone
display we understand that the number displayed during a call is related to the
phone being used by the caller. If the witness testifies to a phone message that has
been recorded we listen without adverting to our basic understanding that phone
messaging devices are capable of capturing “a voice” instantaneously, as it is
speaking. Courts also take judicial notice about the ability of phones to accurately
recreate the sound of particular human voices. No-one questions this even though
modern phone systems digitize and then decode sound waves during transmission
in much the same way that computers convert information into code to be reconsti-
tuted as legible or audible data when displayed or broadcast,35 a point I will return
to below when discussing the “best evidence” rule for computer records. So long as
someone testifies that a voice was heard on a telephone, it is simply accepted that
the phones and transmission services were functioning properly. This is as it should
be. Courts could not function without taking judicial notice of the functioning of
machines, including in this day and age of computers, emails, text messaging, and
the like.
Not surprisingly, this is happening. Documents secured by computers are re-
ceived without evidence about the capacity or function of computers or how com-
puter evidence is generated. Email correspondence is admitted without lessons re-
lating to the functioning of emails. And the same holds true of text messages. Even
more sophisticated technological aspects are noted. In R. v. Woodward,36 for exam-
ple, the Ontario Court of Appeal took judicial notice that all computers work using
logic functions. And in R. v. Ranger37 the Ontario Court of Appeal accepted that a
trial judge could take judicial notice that cell phones are being operated in the gen-
eral geographical location of the cell phone towers that receive their transmissions,
even without the technical testimony offered in R. v. Hamilton.38 The Court also
accepted that “cell phone users engaged in a cell phone call who are travelling from
point A to point B will find their cell phone signal passes from one cell phone
tower to another at different locations along the route from Point A to Point B.”39
This makes it possible for a trial judge to infer that at a particular point in time a
cell phone user was in a location generally proximate to the tower (such as down-
town Ottawa) and that the user was travelling in a given direction over a given
period of time. These are incredibly generous propositions of judicial notice but
they are pragmatic and safe applications of the doctrine.
To understand how important it is to take a functional approach to judicial
notice consider the example of Google Maps. These helpful documents have be-
35 “Telephone” Wikipedia, online: Wikimedia Foundation
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telephone>.
36 R. v. Woodward, 2011 CarswellOnt 9823, [2011] O.J. No. 4216 (Ont. C.A.).
37 R. v. Ranger, 2010 CarswellOnt 8572, [2010] O.J. No. 4840 (Ont. C.A.) [Ranger].
38 Hamilton, supra note 4.
39 Ranger, supra note 37 at para. 16.
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come ubiquitous in court. Indeed, in R. v. Calvert40 the trial judge reviewed a
Google map on his own initiative to ascertain the distance between the scene of
arrest and the police station to determine whether a breath sample had been taken
as soon as practicable. The Ontario Court of Appeal was fine with this since “gen-
erally speaking maps may be relied on by courts when taking judicial notice be-
cause maps are a readily accessible source of indisputable accuracy.”41 The fact
that this particular map was downloaded by computer — that it would have been
input and then converted to code and then reconstituted by elaborate technology
into a discernible image before being displayed and printed — gave the Court no
reason to pause. A map is a map, and a map service that is widely recognized and
relied upon by ordinary persons as authoritative is a reliable enough source to admit
its products into evidence. Calvert makes clear that judicial notice is the key doc-
trine relied upon to access this important litigation tool, even if courts rarely pause
before admitting Google Maps to question their authority.
The same principles would apply to Google Earth images. In a case I was
presiding over a self-represented accused wished to admit into evidence satellite
images he had downloaded. He had images taken on two occasions to show
changes in the terrain relevant to the case. The Crown objected as there was no-one
there to authenticate the images or verify the date stamps. The self-represented ac-
cused was incredulous. He said that his township no longer sends building inspec-
tors but relies on Google satellite images taken over time to verify compliance with
municipal work orders and zoning restrictions on new construction. The public
readily consults Google Earth images, a widely known service. And he could tes-
tify to the accuracy of the structures and road configuration depicted, verifying that
the Google satellite images called up were the one’s sought when the search was
conducted. I admitted the satellite images without any evidence confirming the pro-
cess by which they were captured.
Without taking a functional approach to technology that enables courts to edu-
cate themselves about and rely on the basic properties and capacities of technology,
courts would either have to lose step with the real world, or pointlessly increase
their dependency on expert evidence and foundational technical evidence to get
things right.
(c) Electronic Records, Authentication and the Best Evidence Rule
(i) Overview
There is a network of rules relating to the proof of documents secured from
computers and similar devices. Together these rules appear to be complex. In fact,
if interpreted sensibly the electronic document rules rarely impede admission and
can be dealt with efficiently, even summarily.
The statutory provisions about to be examined create two special hurdles
where electronic documents are being offered — authenticity rules and “best evi-
dence” rules. As will be seen, the statutory authentication rule mirrors the common
law rule for ordinary documents. It adds nothing of significance.
40 R. v. Calvert, 2011 CarswellOnt 3470, 2011 ONCA 379 (Ont. C.A.).
41 Ibid.
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As for the “best evidence” rules, their name is misleading. At common law
“best evidence” rules are designed to promote the use of original documents. The
best evidence rules applicable to electronic documents from computer and similar
devices are not concerned with requiring original documents to be proved, but in-
stead seek to ensure that an electronic document offered in court accurately reflects
the original information that was input into a document. To be clear, these best
evidence rules are not concerned with whether the original information that was
input was accurate information. Documents containing inaccurate information,
even a completely forged document offered as a genuine document, can satisfy the
best evidence rules. The electronic best evidence rules are concerned with what
might happen after the information has been input.
As indicated, each provision is facially intricate but they are not difficult to
satisfy. Two of the best evidence avenues are particularly simple, and widely avail-
able. First, if someone familiar with the information originally input testifies that
the document being offered accurately records that information, authenticity and
best evidence standards will have been met, for this is evidence that the computer
system, having faithfully reproduced the information, must have been functioning
as it should.
Alternatively, if a document appears on its face to be what it is claimed — for
example, an email or a text — testimony that it is the document that was received
or sent by email or text will be presumed to satisfy the authenticity and “best evi-
dence” requirements, unless the opposing party raises a doubt about whether the
computer system was operating properly. Again, the apparent coherence of the doc-
ument coupled with the fact that it was produced or retrieved in the fashion that a
functioning computer would produce or retrieve documents is evidence that the
electronic document system was functioning as it should.
The relevant provisions, about to be described, do not lay any of this out in
simple terms, but interpreted sensibly this is all they require, leaving the law sim-
ple, accessible and practical.
(ii) The Statutory Regime and its Role
Like most provincial evidence statutes, the Canada Evidence Act has provi-
sions addressing issues related to the admissibility of “electronic documents.”42
This is where the rules I have just introduced can be found.
To be clear, subsections 31.1 to 31.8 do not authorize the ultimate admission
of electronic documentary evidence. These provisions deal solely with issues con-
cerning the integrity of the document being offered as proof, not with the admissi-
bility of the document’s contents. “These sections must [therefore] work in con-
junction with either some common law general rule of admissibility of documents
or some other statutory provision”43 in order to make the document admissible.
For example, in R. v. Morgan44 the Crown wanted to admit documents se-
cured from Department of Fisheries and Oceans computers showing the status and
42 Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
43 R. v. Morgan (January 10, 2002), [2002] N.J. No. 15, Flynn Prov. J. (N.L. Prov. Ct.)
[Morgan].
44 Ibid.
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terms of Mr. Morgan’s fishing licence. Sections 31.1 to 31.8 were used to resolve
authentication and “best evidence” concerns while the business records exception
in section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act was used to permit the records to be used
as hearsay proof of their contents. It is helpful to consider it this way. The evidence
did not consist of “electronic records” per se. Electronic records were merely the
delivery mechanism for the evidence, namely the information about Mr. Morgan’s
licence. Section 31.1 to 31.8 deal with the propriety of the delivery mechanism for
evidence. They do not determine whether the evidence being delivered is itself ad-
missible. Other relevant rules, such as the hearsay rule or the opinion evidence rule,
will determine this.45
(iii) The Reach of the Statutory Regime
Subsections 31.1 to 31.8 apply solely to “electronic documents.” The defini-
tion is broad enough to cover copies of all documents stored in a computer, such as
business records, bulletin boards from Facebook or other social media, emails and
or “tweets” (being messages exchanged using Twitter). Subsection 31.8 defines
“electronic document” as follows: 
“Electronic document” means any data that is recorded or stored on any
medium in or by a computer system or other similar device and that can be
read or perceived by a person or a computer system or other similar device.
It includes a display, a printout or other output of that data.
This is a definition of imposing breadth, particularly when combined with the
definition of “data” in subsection 31.8 — “representations of information or of con-
cepts, in any form.” The statutory provisions do not therefore catch only documents
in the conventional sense. They also catch at least some audio and video record-
ings. In R. v. Nichols,46 for instance, the Court applied these provisions to a 9-1-1
tape, presumably stored and retrieved from a computer.47
45 By the same token, the authenticity and best evidence requirements for electronic docu-
ments do not become immaterial because other rules may provide for admission of
documents. These rules address different evidentiary issues. In Morgan, supra note 43
it was arguably incorrect for the Court to treat the provisions in subsection 30(3) of the
Canada Evidence Act for the filing of copies as an alternative basis for admitting the
electronic records that were offered into evidence. The generic provision for copies in
subsection 30(3) applies to otherwise admissible documents. If those documents are
electronic documents they are not otherwise admissible unless the requirements of sub-
sections 31.1–31.8 are met.
46 R. v. Nichols, [2004] O.J. No. 6186, 2004 CarswellOnt 8225 (Ont. C.J.).
47 In R. v. Adams, 2011 CarswellNS 363, (sub nom. R. v. Murphy) [2011] N.S.J. No. 302
(N.S. C.A.) the Court resolved the admission of a CD of photographs without resolving
compliance with subsections 31.2-31.8 of the Canada Evidence Act because the appli-
cation of those provisions was not argued at trial.
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While these provisions would appear to apply to “digitized” recordings,48 “an-
alog” recordings49 captured by conventional audio and video recorders should not
qualify as “electronic documents.” They are not recorded or stored “on any medium
in or by a computer system or other similar device.”
Not only is the definition of “electronic document” too narrow to catch data
stored using analog technology, the most significant “electronic document” provi-
sions address concerns about the integrity of documents that have been converted
from code so that they can be read or perceived by a person. Analog recordings do
not use code. They imitate the conditions that created the sound or image. Analog
devices therefore do not create the same mischief that most of the “electronic docu-
ment” provisions are meant to address.
As the definitions of “electronic document” and “data” reveal, these provi-
sions are also broad enough to catch data secured from computers or captured from
smart phones or similar devices, even if not saved in the form of self-contained
documents. R. v. B. (L.)50 illustrates the point. There the Crown wished to tender
selected information produced and assembled by Telus from its computer records
as a result of a production order. The defence objected that this was not admissible
because no existing document contained the information. The printout was created
from diverse information contained in the computer, assembled into a single docu-
ment printout as a result of the police investigation. The Court held that the printout
was an “electronic document” as defined in subsection 30.8 even though it had not
previously been in document form because the definition speaks not of documents
per se but of “data that is recorded or stored.” This data fit the bill.51
The definition of “electronic document” is also broad enough to permit a court
to use directly as evidence the information that is stored on a computer system
rather than a printout of the data of the contents of the system. This is because the
definition of “electronic document” “includes a display.” For example, subject to
other rules of admissibility a judge is free to rely on these provisions to have the
data on a smart-phone called up and read into the record from the witness stand, or
48 Digitization occurs “when diverse forms of information such as text, sounds, image or
voice are converted into a single binary code.” These codes are stored in a computer
system or other similar device and can be reconverted and displayed in the form of
reproductions of the recorded texts, sounds, image or voices: “Digitizing” Wikipedia,
online: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digitizing>.
49 An analog recording is a created by capturing changes in physical phenomena (sound,
light, temperature, position, pressure) using a device that imprints those changes. The
recording device can be mechanical or electronic and is able to recreate relevant sounds
and images by recreating the same changes in physical phenomena that produced the
sounds or images. There is no reconversion of data as there is in a computer system or
other similar device: “Analog” Wikipedia, online: Wikimedia Foundation
<http://en.wikpedia.org/wiki/Analog>.
50 2009 CarswellBC 2298, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1741 (B.C. S.C.)
51 Moreover, the collected data was admissible as a business record under section 30 of
the Canada Evidence Act even though it was assembled for the prosecution. Since the
record that was admitted simply collated existing data, it was not “a record made in the
course of an investigation or inquiry,” which would have been inadmissible under sub-
section 30(10).
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to have data displayed in court from a computer system that has been made an
exhibit, without violating rules of authenticity or “best evidence” considerations. A
judge can no doubt, in their trial management discretion, insist on the production of
copies where possible,52 but this is not required.
(iv) Authenticity
(A) The test for authenticity
As indicated one of the functions of the electronic document provisions is to
deal with the “authenticity” of electronic documents. This is the role of subsection
31.1, in particular. This provision does nothing more than repeat the “low”53 com-
mon law authenticity standard. At common law authenticity is established for the
purposes of admissibility if the trial judge is satisfied that there is some evidence to
support the conclusion that the thing is what the party presenting it claims it to be.
In R. v. Donald, for example, the New Brunswick Supreme Court (Appeal Divi-
sion) described the common law standard by calling for “some apparently sound
reason” in the evidence for believing the item to be authentic: 
Positive identification is not required. The fact an article has been admitted
in evidence does not, of course, establish that it is the article involved. After
its reception it is a question of fact to be determined by the judge or jury as
to whether or not it is, in fact, such article.54
Section 31.1 embraces the same test: 
Any person seeking to admit an electronic document as evidence has the
burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a find-
ing that the electronic document is that which it is purported to be.
(B) Purpose-based Admissibility
In a book on documentary evidence Douglas Ewart cautioned that “when con-
sidering the admissibility of a document, it is important to keep in mind the purpose
for which it is offered in evidence.”55 A document may be a forgery, but if it is
being offered as proof of a forgery it can be authentic. “This is the very forged
document that the accused relied upon.” Do not confuse genuineness with authen-
ticity. Is there evidence supporting a finding that the electronic document is the
thing which it is purported to be?
52 The authority to do so is no doubt supported by the reasoning in R. v. Felderhof, 2003
CarswellOnt 4943, [2003] O.J. No. 4819 (Ont. C.A.).
53 Alan W Bryant, Sidney N Lederman & Michelle K Fuerst, Sopinka, Lederman & Bry-
ant The Law of Evidence in Canada, 3rd ed, (Toronto: Lexis-Nexis, 2009) at para 2.14
[Law of Evidence] make this point citing R. v. Staniforth, 1979 CarswellOnt 45, [1979]
O.J. No. 1026 (Ont. C.A.). In that case, even though a knife was only tentatively identi-
fied by a witness, its presence under clothes in a bedroom permitted it to be adduced in
a case where the Crown alleged the victim had been threatened with a knife in the
bedroom.
54 R. v. Donald, 1958 CarswellNB 4, 121 C.C.C. 304 (N.B. C.A.), at para. 7.
55 Douglas Ewart, Documentary Evidence in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at 20.
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(C) Authentication and genuineness
Evidence can be “authenticated” even where there is a contest over whether it
is what it purports to be. This is so even though there have been situations where
individuals have created false Facebook pages in the name of others, or where in-
formation has been added by others to someone’s website or social medium home
page,56 and there have been cases where email messages have been forged.57 These
false documents may easily gain admission under the rules. If the party offering the
electronic document offers evidence capable of supporting a finding that it is genu-
ine, section 31.1 will be met regardless of the strength of the case to the contrary.
This is not because the law is disinterested in false documentation. It is simply that
the law prefers to see disputes about authenticity resolved at the end of a case, not
at the admissibility stage. Disputes over authenticity tend to turn on credibility, and
credibility is best judged at the end of the case in the context of all of the evidence.
“Authentication” for the purposes of admissibility is therefore nothing more than a
threshold test requiring that there be some basis for leaving the evidence to the fact-
finder for ultimate evaluation. In R. v. Butler,58 for example, the Court recognized
where there was a live issue about whether the accused generated the Facebook
entries in question that would be for the jury to decide.
(D) Circumstantial Evidence and Authenticity
The authenticity of an electronic document can, of course, be established cir-
cumstantially. For example, in R. v. Sandham e-mails were authenticated as having
been exchanged by members of the Bandidos by “matching specific email ad-
dresses to specific computers at specific residences” that were linked by other evi-
dence to the individuals in question.59 Alternatively, the presence of numerous doc-
uments containing the name of an individual can provide a circumstantial link to
the reputed author.60
At common law, correspondence can be authenticated as having been sent by
an individual by showing that it is a reply to a letter sent to that individual. The
same logically holds true for emails and text messages. If evidence shows someone
sent a text or email to an individual they believe to be linked to that address and
56 For example, a New Jersey woman Dana Thornton was convicted of identity theft for
creating a fake Facebook page in the name of her former boyfriend, a police detective,
in order to embarrass him. “Belleville woman accused of creating fake Facebook page
to mock her ex-boyfriend gets probation” NJ.com (19 March 2012), online: NJ.com
<www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/3/bell>.
57 For example, Sports Illustrated reported that sexual assault complainant Zach
Tomaselli doctored emails to appear as though they came from the police in order to
convince the media that his former basketball coach, Bernie Fine, sexually molested
him. Sports Illustrated, (30 January 2012) at 14.
58 See R. v. Butler, 2009 CarswellAlta 1825, [2009] A.J. No. 1242 (Alta. Q.B.).
59 R. v. Sandham, 2009 CarswellOnt 6608, [2009] O.J. No. 4527 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Sandham].
60 See R. v. Winchester, 2010 CarswellOnt 397, [2010] O.J. No. 693 (Ont. S.C.J.) where
this kind of evidence was relied on at the end of a case to link a seized computer to the
accused.
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there is a response from the person purportedly written to, that is some evidence of
authenticity.
Similarly, text messages can be linked to particular phones by examining the
recorded number of the sender and receiving evidence linking that number to the
person in question. And Facebook and blog entries can be circumstantially authen-
ticated by examining the contents of the home page identifying whose home page
or blog it is. This requires reliance on the notorious and incontrovertible fact that
the accepted, routine and widely dependable way to identify the individuals who
operate social network pages and blogs is to examine the identifying information
supplied.
All of this is a liberal way of doing things but it is in keeping with ordinary
standards of authentication.
(E) Authenticity and the Accuracy of “Computer By-Product
Evidence”
Authenticity is about whether the electronic document is that which it is pur-
ported to be. It is not concerned with whether the “computer by-product evidence”
associated with the document is accurate. As explained when discussing expert evi-
dence, “computer by-product evidence” is information generated by the operation
of computers. Date and time stamps are an example. When an email or text mes-
sage is sent or when a file is created, a date and time record is apt to be created
automatically. These records may not be accurate. If the date and time set for the
computer is set inaccurately, the date and time records created by the computer will
reflect this inaccuracy. It is also possible for the metadata containing the date and
time information, or even reporting the file type such as “doc” (for document file)
or “jpg” (for image file) to be altered. Errors in the computer by-product evidence
has no bearing on whether the file or documents itself has been authenticated.61
61 Care must be exercised with date and time stamps, even when the computer is properly
synchronized and no-one tampers with the meta-date. The date and time recorded by
the recipient of a text message sent to an iPhone, for example, shows when the phone
received a text-message, not when it was sent. If the iPhone was not turned on at the
time the message was sent, the sending and receiving times will not correspond. It is
therefore important to clarify by evidence or admission what the relevant date and time
stamp purports to show. This caused me confusion in a case involving a text message
exchange printed by the accused person. The complainant acknowledged sending the
message but was adamant she had not sent it in the morning hours because she is never
awake at that time. I now understand that the timing discrepancy recorded in the docu-
ment generated using the accused persons’ phone reflects when the accused person
turned his phone on. Other things can go wrong. In a case I recently presided over the
police used a computer program to extract and record all text message exchanges be-
tween the cellphone and a particular number linked to the accused. That program auto-
matically converted all date and time stamps to Greenwich Mean Time, creating a four
hour discrepancy. This did not make the text messages inadmissible. It did, however,
require care. Fortunately a combination of judicial notice about relative time zones,
circumstantial evidence, and testimony about the timing of events allowed the time and
date stamps to be verified and converted.
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(v) The Best Evidence Rule
The second role played by subsections 31.1 to 31.8 in electronic documents is
to satisfy the “best evidence rule.” To appreciate the implications of these provi-
sions and to apply them sensibly, the limited role of the “best evidence rule” must
be understood.
(A) The Limited Role of the Best Evidence Rules
At common law that rule was once of general application. It required a party
to produce the best evidence available. It was both a rule of exclusion (do not pro-
duce inferior evidence if you have better) and a rule of inclusion (if you do not
have better, the evidence you have is acceptable if otherwise admissible).62 These
conceptions of the best evidence rule gradually fell into disuse. Now its only rem-
nant is “if an original document is available in one’s hands, one must produce it.”63
If it is not available a copy can be admitted unless the document is a contract whose
terms are in dispute or the integrity of a will or affidavit is at issue. Concerns about
fraud and error in copying go only to weight.64
Subsections 31.1 to 31.8 of the Canada Evidence Act do not resurrect the an-
cient common law conception of the best evidence rule. Compliance with its provi-
sions in no way verifies that the evidence in question is better than other proof. It
was therefore perilous to declare, as the Court did in R. v. Morgan, that evidence
complying with subsections 31.1 to 31.8’s best evidence rules is “considered to be
the best evidence available.”65 This connotes that electronic documents proved us-
ing these provisions trump other evidence. They do not. They bear the weight they
warrant and the information they contain may ultimately be rejected because of
competing proof.
The significance of the best evidence rule, both at common law and under
subsections 31.1 to 31.8 of the Canada Evidence Act, is further limited by a gener-
ous conception of what qualifies as an “original document.” This makes it easier to
comply with the rule. At common law if documents are executed in duplicate, all
duplicates are originals.66 Since the advent of modern methods for mechanically
producing faithful copies of documents, a variety of rules of practice and statutory
provisions have been created to provide a generous gateway to the admission of
copies in lieu of an original.67
The advent of computerized documents loosened the noose of the rule even
more. The computerization of documents creates significant ambiguity about what
the original is. Is it the actual hard drive containing the code, the translation of the
62 See Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, Law of Evidence, supra note 53 at paras. 18.4 to 18.8.
63 Garton v. Hunter (1968), [1969] 1 All E.R. 451 (Eng. C.A.), at 453 per Denning L.J.,
followed in Canada. See, for example R. v. Shayesteh, 1996 CarswellOnt 4226, 111
C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.), at 253 [C.C.C.].
64 See Bryant, Lederman &Fuerst, Law of Evidence, supra note 53 at paras. 18 to 24.
65 R. v. Morgan, supra note 43.
66 R. v. Walsh, 1980 CarswellOnt 16, [1980] O.J. No. 809 (Ont. C.A.).
67 See Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, Law of Evidence, supra note 53 at paras. 18.24 to
18.42.
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code that is displayed by the electronic device, a copy of the file, or the first print
out? The common law was arriving at the generous point that any of these things
will do. In keeping with this the Canada Evidence Act provisions treat print-outs
from electronic storage devices the way the common law treats duplicates. As indi-
cated above, the statute accepts any observable translation of the computer code as
sufficient — a live display on the computer using the original device, a file on a
memory stick, or a printed representation of the computer-stored information.
Given the generous statutory conception of an original document, the primary role
the “best evidence” provisions of the Canada Evidence Act play is as merely as an
adjunct to authenticity. The provisions exist, not so much to assure that the best
evidence is presented, but to provide some further assurance that the document pro-
vided to the courts is the same as the one that was input into the computer.
There are four ways in which this can be done. Specifically, the “best evidence
rule” requirements of the Canada Evidence Act can be met by:
1. Proving the integrity of the document system that recorded or stored
the document by evidence (s.31.2(1)(a));
2. Proving the integrity of the document system that recorded or stored
the document by relying on one of the three presumptions provided for in
subsection 31.3 (subsection 31.2(a)), namely the “functioning system”
presumption, the “opposing party” presumption, and the “third party bus-
iness record” presumption;
3. In the case of documents bearing secure electronic signatures, by rely-
ing on a presumption provided for by regulation pursuant to subsection
31.4 (subsection 31.2(b)); and
4. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, by proving that the docu-
ment has been manifestly or consistently acted on, relied on or used as a
record of the information recorded or stored in a printout (subsection
31.2(2)).
In effect, these rules augment the authentication process by providing some
assurance of “continuity” between the data that was input, and the information on
the electronic document being offered in court. Method 1 and the first presumption
in Method 2 require evidence of the capacity of the document system to capture,
store and retrieve information accurately. This is similar to demonstrating authen-
ticity by proving a “chain of custody” by showing that a toxicological sample went
from hand to hand, except that the chain of custody of the electronically recorded
information is from input data, to computer code, to computer code translated for
display or copying. Showing that the document system was functioning properly is
evidence that it was able to, and did maintain the data. These methods address the
risk of technical failure.
The second and third presumption in Method 2, as well as Methods 3 and 4,
provide some assurance that no changes in the document information have been
caused either by technical failure or human intervention. These methods rely on
circumstantial indicia of reliability associated with the electronic document. If it is
a document from the opposing party litigant who will be familiar enough with it to
raise accuracy concerns, or if it is used as a business record by a third party or is a
printout that has been consistently acted on as an accurate record, or if it has been
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE   201
signed electronically, this provides some assurance the document is an accurate re-
production of the input data and was in no way changed.
The “best evidence” requirements can be satisfied by meeting any one of these
4 methods. Paradoxically if Method 1 or the first presumption in Method 2 are
employed a document can gain admission without any indication that no human
intervention occurred.
These various methods of satisfying the best evidence rule can be achieved by
calling live evidence to prove their preconditions, or by filing affidavit evidence
under subsection 31.6. When proof by affidavit is offered, the opposing party can
seek leave to cross-examine the affiant.
In spite of the elaborate statutory scheme, the daily practice in the courts is for
electronic documents to be admitted without formal compliance with these provi-
sions. This is easily demonstrated. Everyone who works in our courts recognizes
that electronic records are becoming a staple in modern courtrooms. Electronic
documents — emails, text messages, tweets, Google maps, Google earth images, 9-
1-1 calls, recorded phone messages, digitized photographs — are admitted rou-
tinely. Yet there are few reported cases dealing with these “best evidence” provi-
sions, and I venture to say that most lawyers and judges would confirm that it is
uncommon to see submissions or rulings in court relating to the application of these
“best evidence” provisions, let alone “best evidence” affidavits. Electronic docu-
ments are being admitted either (1) without appreciation of the statutory provisions,
(2) through the practice of interpreting the absence of objection on these grounds as
tacit implicit consent to admissibility, or (3) through the applications of an un-
stated, liberal conception of judicial notice.
There is some peril in proceeding in each of these ways, but particularly the
first two. These provisions create a legal prerequisite to admissibility. Technically,
the party with the onus should discharge that onus unless opposing counsel for-
mally agrees on record that the documents satisfy statutory “best evidence” require-
ments. Absent formal agreement that the best evidence rules have been satisfied,
there must be an evidentiary basis supporting admission. In R. v. Bellingham,68 for
example, an expert forensic accountant’s report offered to prove the theft of lottery
tickets was excluded. It contained information generated by Lottery Alberta pur-
porting to confirm lottery ticket sales but the only evidence called to support the
data was the complainant’s testimony that she received the information from sheets
Lottery Alberta provided. No evidence was led relating to how Lottery Alberta gen-
erated the information and so it was inadmissible.
Having said this, the best evidence standards of admissibility are not exacting.
This is because the law of evidence is intended to be functional and to aid in the
efficient presentation of relevant information that can be rationally evaluated.
When these provisions are given an overlay of common sense, they can perform
their function unobtrusively. This can be seen by examining the technical require-
ments of these provisions and considering their application.
68 R. v. Bellingham, 2002 CarswellAlta 487, [2002] A.J. No. 476 (Alta. Prov. Ct.).
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(B) Method 1 — Proving the integrity of the document system
Subsection 31.2(1)(a) provides: 
31 (2) The best evidence rule in respect of an electronic document is
satisfied
(a) on proof of the integrity of the electronic document system by
or in which the electronic document was recorded or stored.
“Integrity” is not defined but clearly refers to the ability of the system to re-
cord and store information accurately. “‘Integrity’ is a concept of consistency of
actions, values, methods, measures, principles, expectations and outcomes.”69 If
evidence shows on the balance of probability that the electronic document system
had the capacity accurately to record, maintain and display the data, proof of the
“integrity of the electronic document system” will be demonstrated.
The degree of proof of the integrity of the electronic document is not specified
in the section. Where a statutory rule of evidence does not specify a standard that
has to be met when proving prerequisites to admissibility, the “balance of
probability” standard is to be applied.70 Method 1’s reference to “on proof” there-
fore requires that the party seeking admission establish that it is more probable than
not that the electronic document system had integrity. As will be seen, this can be
done with the aid of the presumptions provided for in Method 2 below.
Evidence of the “integrity of the electronic document system” can be provided
through direct testimony about the actual operation of the system or it can be
proved circumstantially with the aid of subsection 31.5. Subsection 31.5 specifi-
cally invites a court to receive and act upon circumstantial evidence of the integrity
of the system, namely, that the electronic document system operated according to
relevant standards, procedures, usage or practices used in the relevant type of busi-
ness, enterprise or endeavour.
The integrity of the system can also be proved by inference from other evi-
dence. In R. v. Nichols,71 for example, the Court held that a 9-1-1 recording system
was functioning properly because individuals who heard the call live said that the
recording reproduced what they heard at the time. This reasoning is circular in the
sense that the purpose of these provisions is to ensure that the electronic documents
system is functioning so that the accuracy of the displayed record can be assured. In
Nichols evidence of the accuracy of the record was used to prove that the electronic
system had integrity, thereby enabling the court to conclude that the record was
accurate enough to admit. Yet this reasoning is appropriate and to be encouraged. It
would be preposterous to reject the admission of an “electronic record” that is at-
tested by a witness with first-hand knowledge to be an accurate reproduction of a
document, sound, or image simply because the technical capacity of the electronic
recording device to do what the witness said it did has not been demonstrated.
69 “Integrity” Wikipedia, online: Wikimedia Foundation
<http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/integrity>.
70 See Paciocco & Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, supra note 13 at 45–47; R. v. Oakes,
1986 CarswellOnt 95, 1986 CarswellOnt 1001, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
71 R. v. Nichols, 2004 CarswellOnt 8225, [2004] O.J. No. 6186 (Ont. C.J.).
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This approach is comparable to common law authentication practices. At com-
mon law there is no need to prove the accuracy of the system used to record infor-
mation if there is direct testimony from a witness that the event was recorded accu-
rately. In R. v. Murphy, for example, the person who took the photos testified that
they accurately depicted what he had seen when taking them. The trial judge ini-
tially excluded the photos on the basis that the integrity of the system used to re-
cord and store them had not been demonstrated.72 The Nova Scotia Court of Ap-
peal held that the trial judge had erred. Technical proof of the operation of the
system was not needed given that there was direct evidence of accuracy from a
witness to the event recorded.
The same approach must apply to electronic documents. Where there are wit-
nesses attesting directly to the accuracy of the electronic record it can be inferred
that the electronic recording system had integrity. Any other conclusion would
pointlessly complicate the trial and produce the indefensible outcome that different
standards of admissibility would apply to analog and digital photos and recordings.
Analog recordings, not being electronic documents, could be admitted using the
generous common law standards, but digital recordings would have to comply with
a pointlessly grudging requirement that the integrity of the electronic document
system be addressed directly.
For this reason, there should never be “best evidence” concerns arising for
emails, texts, tweets or Facebook messages that a witness claims to have sent or
posted. If a witness authenticates the electronic documents being offered to the
court as “accurate” the integrity of the electronic document system can be inferred,
and the “best evidence” provisions can be treated as satisfied.
(C) Method 2 — the presumptions of integrity of the electronic
documents system
According to the statute, the integrity of the electronic documents system can
be proved if any one of three presumptions contained in subsection 31.3 applies. If
this occurs and the presumption is not “rebutted,” the “integrity of the documents
system” will be established thereby satisfying subsection 31.2(1)(a), the provision
just described.
A “presumption” is a legal shortcut to proving a desired fact. It permits the
desired fact to be established indirectly. A rule of evidence creating a presumption
enables a party wanting to prove Fact “B” [call it “the presumed fact”] to achieve
this by proving a different fact, Fact “A” [a “basic fact”]. If the party proves that
basic fact, the presumed fact is inferred to exist unless the accuracy of that pre-
sumed fact is rebutted by the opposing party.
In the current context this means that if the party tendering the evidence
proves the basic facts outlined in one of the evidentiary presumptions in subsection
31.4, the presumed fact — that the electronic documents system by or in which an
72 R. v. Adams, 2011 CarswellNS 363, (sub nom. R. v. Murphy) [2011] N.S.J. No. 302
(N.S. C.A.). This case actually dealt with electronic documents as the photos had been
digitized and were being presented in the form of a CD, but the Court applied the
common law standard as the application of subsections 31.3–31.9 had not been ad-
dressed at trial.
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electronic document is recorded or stored has integrity — is deemed to be
“proven,” “in the absence of evidence to the contrary.” Where the term — “evi-
dence to the contrary” appears in a presumption, a “mandatory presumption” has
been created. This means that once the basic facts have been demonstrated, the
presumed fact will be inferred unless the opposing party points to evidence in the
proceedings that raises a reasonable doubt about the accuracy of the presumed
fact.73
The presumptions created by subsection 31.3 provide different standards for
proving the requisite basic facts. Presumption 31.3(a), about to be described, calls
for “evidence capable of supporting a finding that. . .[the electronic documents sys-
tem] was operating properly.” The term “evidence capable” suggests a threshold
level of proof comparable to the legal standard required for authentication and sim-
ilar to the prima facie case and “air of reality standards.” Even if the court itself
would not conclude that the basic fact has been proved, if there is evidence capable
of satisfying a reasonable trier of fact that it has been proved, then the basic fact
will be taken to have been established.
By contrast, the second two presumptions provided for in subsection 31.3 call
for the basic facts to be “established.” Whenever someone is called upon to “show”
“demonstrate” “prove” or “establish” a fact and no standard of proof for doing so is
expressed, the default standard of proof that applies to admissibility preconditions
generally applies; the party must “establish” the evidentiary precondition “on the
balance of probabilities.”74
(ii) Presumption 1 — the functioning system presumption
Subsection 31.3(a) provides: 
31.3 For the purposes of subsection 31.2(1), in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the integrity of an electronic documents system by or in which
an electronic document is recorded or stored is proven
(a) by evidence capable of supporting a finding that at all mate-
rial times, the computer system or other similar device used by
an electronic documents system was operating properly or, if it
was not, the fact of its not operating properly did not affect the
integrity of the electronic documents and there are no other rea-
sonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the electronic docu-
ments system.
As this section indicates, this presumption is triggered by admissible information
capable of proving that the electronic documents system was operating properly at
all material times. If the electronic documents system had any problems, the pre-
sumption would not be triggered unless there is a foundation for concluding that the
73 See the discussion of law relating to presumptions in Paciocco & Stuesser, The Law of
Evidence, supra note 13 at 535–541.
74 Standards of proof applicable to admissibility and preconditions are discussed in some
detail in Paciocco & Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, supra note 13 at 43–48 and
535–541.
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problems did not affect the integrity of the electronic documents that have been
recorded, stored and displayed.
The presumed fact, that the electronic document system had integrity, can be
rebutted even if these basic facts are satisfied where there is evidence raising a
reasonable doubt about the ability of the document system accurately to record,
store or display the data accurately.75
This particular presumption should serve as a commodious way of proving the
integrity of electronic documents. It should not take considerable evidence to prove
the material basic fact. If a witness provides evidence that an email or image was
received on a device that functions as a computer, or that a text or tweet was re-
ceived on a phone, this is circumstantial evidence that the computer systems or
other similar devices that sent or received the message were operating properly. If
that document is legible or readable and coherent this is some evidence that the
integrity of the document was unaffected by any problems that may have affected
the computer system. After all, it is certainly incontrovertible and notorious that the
function of an email system is to send and receive messages, or that a smart phone
can send and receive texts and tweets. Simple proof of the receipt of a coherent
document should work with this background information to satisfy the basic fact
required by this presumption.
Although the case did not involve a best evidence presumption, this is essen-
tially the kind of reasoning used in R. v. Woodward76 by the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal. The issue there was whether a child-luring text message met the requirement
in the child luring offence that child-luring was done by a computer system. Exten-
sive expert evidence was given about how text messaging operates. Woodward ar-
gued, however, that the expert failed to give credible evidence that the text messag-
ing system uses “logic” which is a condition of satisfying the definition of a
computer system. The Court responded, “It is beyond all controversy that all com-
puter software programs follow basic logic functions. . . . The fact that the volumi-
nous text messages in this case were successfully sent and received by their in-
tended recipient is evidence that the computer program used in the routing process
performed “logic and control” functions . . .”77 Although the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal did not say so expressly, this same reasoning is available to prove the basic
fact in the presumption in subsection 31.3(a), that the computer system or device
was working properly at the material time. The fact that the voluminous text
messages in the case were successfully sent and received by their intended recipi-
ent, precisely what text messaging systems are meant to achieve, is evidence that
the computer system was functioning properly.
The same should hold true for computer generated documents. If a witness
testifies that a facially coherent document was downloaded from a Facebook or
75 In this regard the qualification expressed in subsection 31.3(a), “there are no other rea-
sonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the electronic documents system,” is redun-
dant. The chapeau to the presumption already provided that, like the other presump-
tions in subsection 31.3, it would operate only “in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.”
76 R. v.Woodward, 2011 CarswellOnt 9823, [2011] O.J. No. 4216 (Ont. C.A.).
77 Ibid.
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other home page or blog or a website such as Google maps, a court should be able
to infer that the electronic document system was working at the material times and
is unaffected by any problems that site or the internet provider may have exper-
ienced. Again, judicial notice can be taken that computers function by downloading
information on command. If targeted information is discovered in response to a
command that is some evidence of functionality. The very retrieval of the data pro-
vides confirmation that the “electronic documents system” was operating properly
as it demonstrates that the “electronic documents system” successfully performed
the function it was intended to perform.
This appears to be what some courts are doing in practice, without articulating
their reasoning. In Girouard v. Druet,78 for example, the Court applied the New
Brunswick Electronic Transactions Act after referencing the similar Canada Evi-
dence Act provisions for guidance. It then admitted emails shown to have been
exchanged between two parties. The only comment the Court made relating to the
evidentiary basis supporting their admission was to observe that “there were no
submissions that the e-mails had been altered.” Although the Court did not put it
this way, its finding was effectively that there was evidently nothing to rebut the
inference available on proof of the receipt of the emails that the system of record-
ing, storing and retrieving the emails was obviously working properly. Similarly in
Izyuk v. Bilousov the fact that the parties frequently exchanged emails sustained a
finding that they were accurate.79
This is a sensible way of proceeding. As the Court in Girouard80 remarked,
courts encounter emails on a daily basis as their use has become a way of life. The
same holds true with social media and downloaded information. It would not be
realistic, indeed it would be counterproductive, to expect individuals who rely on
such information to produce witnesses or even affidavit evidence from Internet Ser-
vice Providers that their systems were functioning properly, or to present the courts
78 Girouard v. Druet, 2011 CarswellNB 402, [2011] N.B.J. No. 260 (N.B. Q.B.); reversed
2012 CarswellNB 227, 2012 CarswellNB 228 (N.B. C.A.) [Girouard]. But see
Narayan v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2009 CarswellNat 1158, 2009 CarswellNat
1159, [2009] C.P.S.L.R.B. No. 40 (Can. P.S.L.R.B.) where the Board excluded an
email after citing this section because there was no evidence of the integrity of the
computer system used by the grievor. The Board did not use this provision properly. It
appears to have assumed incorrectly that subsection 31.3(a) is a necessary condition to
admissibility when it is only one path to satisfying the best evidence rule. In Narayan
there was evidence calling into question the integrity of the email as it did not reflect
the characteristics of “normal printouts for AOL subscribers” but this should not have
rebutted this “best evidence” presumption. The presumption is concerned not with
whether the information input is genuine but with whether the computer system or
other device was operating properly. Still, the case does reflect an insistence on direct
proof the computer system was working before this presumption can become engaged,
an approach I would not encourage.
79 Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2011 CarswellOnt 14392, [2011] O.J. No. 5814 (Ont. S.C.J.). The
Ontario Evidence Act, whose provisions largely mirror those of the Canada Evidence
Act would have applied in this civil case.
80 Girouard, supra note 78.
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with pointless recitals by witnesses about the history of problems they have exper-
ienced with their computers or smart phones.
To feel fully comfortable with all of this it is important to reinforce the limits
of the “best evidence” requirement in question. What has to be shown is the integ-
rity of the electronic documents system by which an electronic document is “re-
corded or stored.” The thing that was recorded may have been input inaccurately by
the individual typing the message or selecting the image for downloading but this is
not a matter affecting the best evidence rule. This may affect the admissibility of
the information based on other evidentiary principles such as relevance concerns,
or the weight of the evidence may be undermined, but if it is presumed that the data
displayed is the data that was recorded and stored, “best evidence” principles have
been satisfied.
The same is true with concerns about whether the person identified as the
sender of the email really sent it, or whether a Facebook page was really authored
by the person who is identified as the owner. These are matters of relevance and
would not impact on the operation of this presumption. These concerns have noth-
ing to do with the functionality of the electronic document system.
Similarly, a court may have concerns about whether the information that was
posted is accurate — for example, is the distance between two points really what
Google maps claims it to be — but that is not a “best evidence” consideration. It is
a hearsay consideration governed by other rules of admissibility.
(ii) Presumption 2 — the opposing party litigant presumption
Subsection 31.3(b) provides: 
31.3 For the purposes of subsection 31.2(1), in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the integrity of an electronic documents system by or in which
an electronic document is recorded or stored is proven
(b) if it is established that the electronic document was recorded
or stored by a party who is adverse in interest to the party seek-
ing to introduce it.
Unlike the presumption in subsection 31.3(a), the basic facts required to trigger this
presumption must be proved on the balance of probabilities. This requires credibil-
ity issues relating to those components to be resolved at the admissibility stage.
This presumption is tremendously useful to the Crown in criminal cases. Any
electronic document seized from a computer or smart phone or similar device that
was probably used by the accused will be presumed to satisfy the best evidence
requirements of admissibility unless the accused can show that the electronic docu-
ments system was not able to record and store information accurately. Any elec-
tronic document that other witnesses can link to the accused as probably recorded
or stored by him will receive the same treatment. R. v. Sandham81 is an illustration
of an email that would satisfy subsection 31.3(b), even though the application of
the electronic document best evidence provisions of the Canada Evidence Act do
not appear to have been in issue in that case. The Crown produced an unsent email
found on a computer at the home of a third party. It was sent from an email account
81 Sandham, supra note 59.
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held by the accused, and in this gang-related prosecution the email was helpfully
signed “Prospect Bandido Bill,” an identifier consistent with evidence that the ac-
cused, Bill Sandham, held himself out to be a prospect Bandido. Since the elec-
tronic document was probably recorded by the accused it satisfied the best evidence
provisions of subsection 31.3(b).
The theory underlying this presumption is not unlike the theory that supports
the “statements by opposing party litigant” exception to the hearsay rule. If the
source of the information is the opposing party, the opposing party is best able to
explain the evidence away if it is unreliable. They know better whether their elec-
tronic documents system has integrity and if they wish to rebut the inference that it
does, they can present evidence.
The fact that an accused person may have to testify in order to rebut this pre-
sumption where it is relied upon by the Crown does not constitute an unconstitu-
tional reversal of onus. The principle against self-incrimination is infringed only
where the legal burden is reversed — in other words, where a legal rule requires the
accused to testify. It is not offended where tactically the accused may feel it neces-
sary to testify.82 Under this rule the accused is free to rebut the presumption by
relying on other sources of evidence. If there are no other ways to rebut the pre-
sumption in the particular circumstances of the case, that is the accused’s misfor-
tune. He has to make a tactical decision whether to testify in order to rebut the
provision, or to let the presumption operate.
(iii) Presumption 3 — the business records presumption
Subsection 31.3(c) provides: 
31.3 For the purposes of subsection 31.2(1), in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the integrity of an electronic documents system by or in which
an electronic document is recorded or stored is proven
(c) if it is established that the electronic document was recorded
or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person
who is not a party and who did not record or store it under the
control of the party seeking to introduce it.
Like subsection 31.3(b), the basic facts required to trigger the presumption
have to be proved on the balance of probabilities. Reliance on the document as a
business record is some circumstantial evidence of its accuracy on the theory that if
it is sufficiently accurate for a business to use it, it must meet admissibility thresh-
olds of reliability.
82 See R. v. Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, 2000 CarswellOnt 3321, 2000 CarswellOnt
3322 (S.C.C.) at paras. 47–52 for a description of the difference between legal and
tactical burdens.
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(D) Method 3 — the presumption for documents signed with secure
electronic signature
The third method of satisfying the “best evidence” requirements relating to
electronic documents is supplied by subsection 31.2(b). It provides as follows: 
31.2 (1) The best evidence rule in respect of an electronic document is
satisfied
(b) if an evidentiary presumption established under subsection
31.4 applies.
Subsection 31.4 creates yet another exception. It states: 
31.4 The Governor General in Council may make regulations establishing
evidentiary presumptions in favour in relation to electronic documents
signed with secure electronic signatures, including relations respecting
(a) The association of secure electronic signatures with persons;
and
(b) The integrity of information contained in an electronic docu-
ment signed with secure electronic signatures.
On 10 March 2011 the Secure Electronic Signature Regulations, initially
adopted in 2005 as SOR/2005-30, were revised and annexed to the Canada Evi-
dence Act and the Personal Property Information Protection and Electronic Docu-
ments Act. The only presumption included in the regulation is found in section 5.
This presumption does not expressly presume the integrity of information that is
signed with an electronic signature as provided for in the statute.83 Instead it pro-
vides: 
5. When the technology or process set out in section 2 is used in respect of
data contained in an electronic document, that data is presumed, in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, to have been signed by the person who is
identified in, or can be identified through, the digital signature certificate.
Finding that data was signed by the accused is obviously useful in authenticat-
ing that data. Although there is no case law dealing with the issue, the signing of
data would appear to be sufficient circumstantial evidence of its integrity. This is
because data is signed either when it is recorded or at some later point where it is
displayed after being stored. Either way, if it is presumed that the data presented in
evidence above or under an electronic signature was the same data signed by the
person identified, it can be inferred that the data was recorded, stored, and has been
displayed with integrity. That being said, this is not apt to be a common or conve-
nient gateway for establishing admissibility. To rely on this presumption the elec-
tronic signature would have to be authenticated.
(E) Method 4 — electronic document print outs
The final method of satisfying the best evidence elements for electronic docu-
ments is by relying on yet another statutory presumption, this one found in subsec-
83 Sections 2–5 provide statutory preconditions for the certification and use of electronic
signatures.
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tion 31.2(2). It is useful only where relying on “printouts” of documents initially
recorded or stored in a computer or other similar device. 
31 (2) Despite subsection (1), in the absence of evidence to the contrary, an
electronic document in the form of a printout satisfies the best evidence rule
if the printout has been manifestly or consistently acted on, relied on or used
as a record of the information recorded or stored in the printout.
The theory is evidently that if a printout of the information is manifestly or consist-
ently acted on or relied on or used as a record of the information recorded or stored,
errors in the information are apt to be discovered and corrected. In effect, if the
document is a reliable enough record for those who are keeping it, it has sufficient
integrity to be admitted into evidence.
What makes this provision unique among the relevant “best evidence” pre-
sumptions is that the presumed fact is not that the electronic document system has
integrity. It is that the “printout satisfies the best evidence rule.” It is unusual to see
an evidentiary tool such as a presumption used to presume a legal outcome rather
than a factual finding, so the provision is somewhat curious. What makes the provi-
sion doubly curious is that it provides for a rebuttable presumption without identi-
fying what fact is to be rebutted. If the party presents evidence of a printout mani-
festly and consistently relied upon or used as a record of the information recorded
or stored on the printout, the printout is said to be admissible in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, but the provision does not specify “to the contrary” of
what. How does one rebut a legal conclusion provided for by statute — that the
best evidence rule is satisfied — with evidence?
The only sensible interpretation is that when the drafters used the term “satis-
fies the best evidence rule” in subsection 31.2(2) they were referring to the indirect
definition of that rule contained in subsection 31.2(1)(a) — that the best evidence
rule is satisfied upon proof of the integrity of the electronic document system. This
would enable the presumption to be interpreted as providing that if there is evi-
dence raising a reasonable doubt about the proper functioning of the electronic doc-
ument system at the material times, this provision cannot be relied upon to satisfy
the best evidence rule, even if a printout is manifestly or consistently acted on,
relied on or used as a record of the information recorded or stored in the printout.
(d) The Law of Hearsay
(i) Hearsay and Computer Generated Information
A great deal of technological evidence will be presented in the form of data
generated using computers. This data will typically be offered as representing accu-
rate factual information. In other words, it will generally be admitted for the truth
of its contents. This does not necessarily make it hearsay evidence. While state-
ments of fact recorded by humans on computer-like devices will be hearsay if of-
fered to prove those recorded facts to be true, information created by mechanical
means by a computer-like device — “computer generated information” — is not
hearsay. This kind of information, including date and time stamps attached to
emails or text messages, or coded address information used to identify Internet Ser-
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vice Providers and accounts, is original or real evidence.84 This is because the hear-
say rule captures only information communicated by human beings and is based on
the inability to cross-examine the human witness who purports to know the infor-
mation. For this reason the classic definition of hearsay in Subramaniam v Public
Prosecutor identifies hearsay by examining whether “a statement made to a witness
by a person” is hearsay or not.85 Computer generated information, even though
produced using a program designed by a person, is not the statement of a person.
Think of it this way. Computer generated information is no more hearsay than the
ring of an alarm clock communicating it is 7:00 a.m. There is no risk of dishonesty
and no hearsay rules are engaged.
The only admissibility issues arising from the fact that relevant information is
“computer generated” relate to the accuracy and reliability of the technology that
produced the information. For example, in R. v. Gratton86 a printout of the “sen-
sory diagnostic module” of a computerized system in a truck purported to record
the speed of a vehicle five seconds prior to airbag deployment. This evidence was
excluded not as hearsay but because expert evidence was required to establish the
reliability of the technology.
This does not mean that expert evidence is always required. Judicial notice can
be taken of the reliability of some such information. For example, it is notorious
that a phone number recorded on a digital phone display while the phone is ringing
is a reliable indication that the call that is occurring is from the number displayed.
The same would hold true with numbers displayed by the “recent calls” function of
digital phones or answering machines.
It can also be accepted, one would suppose, that computer generated date and
time displays are reliable enough to admit. This is so notwithstanding the cautions
expressed above about the potential imprecision of date and time displays. In spite
of this, it is widely understood that computer devices incorporate time and date
features that are reliable enough to use in the ordinary conduct of business. There
are, however, issues of weight. As explained above, dates and times displayed by a
computer-system are only as accurate as the general date and time setting on the
computer or program, as the case may be. The risk that the time may not be entirely
accurate is not necessarily a basis for exclusion though. Just as courts receive times
recorded by wrist watches without evidence of their synchronization, computer
generated times should not become inadmissible because precision is not validated.
If precision is required to give the evidence full weight, evidence of synchroniza-
tion may however be required. In R. v. Hamilton,87 for example, times recorded in
electronic cell-phone records of service providers were out of sync with the elec-
tronic 9-1-1 records. This did not render the records inadmissible but did limit the
precision of the time/location inferences relating to cell-phone users that could be
drawn from the evidence.
84 See Paciocco & Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, supra note 13 at 469, citing JW Strong
ed, McCormick on Evidence, 4th ed (St Paul, MN: West, 1992) at 505-506 and R. v.
Spiby (1990), 91 Cr. App. R. 186 (Eng. C.A.).
85 Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965 (Malaysia P.C.), at 969.
86 R. v. Gratton, 2003 ABQB 728, 2003 CarswellAlta 1241 (Alta. Q.B.).
87 Hamilton, supra note 4.
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(ii) Proving the Fact that Statements were Made
When electronic records that were initially in-put by humans are being offered
as an accurate record of facts or events, hearsay exceptions will generally have to
exist before the evidence is admitted. By contrast hearsay rules are not engaged if
what is being proved is the simple act of recording specific words into a text mes-
sage or other computer record. For example, it is not hearsay to prove the electronic
record of a text message if that is being done to prove that an accused person at-
tempted to make contact with someone in breach of an undertaking. The message is
not coming in to prove the truth of what it is meant to communicate. The message
is being proved to demonstrate the fact that attempted communication occurred.
(iii) Circumstantial Evidence Statements
There are also times where recorded information can be used as circumstantial
evidence without violating the hearsay rule, and this can occur with electronically
recorded documents. The hearsay/circumstantial evidence divide can be concep-
tually challenging because it involves using evidence that can serve as hearsay, in a
non-hearsay way. It is often difficult for jurists to disregard the hearsay use when
trying to recognize the non-hearsay application. Consider, for example, an airline
ticket. It will record the name and destination of the traveller and identify the car-
rier and travel date. If the information recorded on the ticket were to be relied upon
as a simple declaration of the facts it records in the same way a diary entry by the
traveller recording their flight details might be used, it would be hearsay. But an
airline ticket is different than a diary entry. The airline ticket itself has meaning. An
airline ticket is required before the bearer is permitted to board a flight. If someone
carries an airline ticket in their own name which authorizes travel the next day on a
particular flight, the nature and role of that document constitutes solid circumstan-
tial evidence that the person is intending to travel the next day. Similarly, if a dis-
carded plane ticket is found on an airplane it is circumstantial evidence that the
named bearer was likely on that plane. While the recorded information is used to
draw these inferences, this information is not being relied upon as a simple asser-
tion of fact. It is the fact that this information is found on a document recognizable
as an airline ticket that yields the material inferences. Relying on the airline ticket
to draw inferences from the fact that the document is a ticket capable of being
transacted by the named individual does not involve hearsay uses.
By the same token, evidence that a document containing a radio frequency
identification tag linked to a person was used at a particular location is circumstan-
tial evidence that the document was scanned at that location, and can be circum-
stantial evidence that person was there at the time the document was scanned. This
is not hearsay. It is circumstantial evidence.
(iv) Hearsay Exceptions
There are, of course, numerous hearsay exceptions, apart from the principled
exception, that can result in admissible hearsay drawn from electronic documents.
A number of these exceptions are particularly important.
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(A) The “Statement by Opposing Party Litigant” exception
The “statement by opposing party litigant” exception, sometimes called the
“admission exception,” will permit electronic communications by accused persons
to be admitted for hearsay purposes. If those statements are made to persons in
authority the voluntariness rule will generally have to be satisfied but it is rare for
individuals to communicate with justice officials electronically. This exception is
therefore apt to capture the vast majority of electronic communications authored by
accused persons.
The requirements of the exception are simple. If it can be proved on the bal-
ance of probabilities that the accused authored or made a relevant, authenticated
electronic communication, it can come in.88 It does not matter whether the accused
thought he was making an incriminating admission at the time. If the opposing
party, the Crown, wants to use an electronic communication authored by the ac-
cused, it can be admitted. It does not even matter whether the accused had personal
knowledge of the factual claims made in the electronic communication. If the ac-
cused asserts a fact, even based on his belief, that assertion is evidence against him.
The fact it is a statement about something the accused does not have personal
knowledge about goes to weight alone, not admissibility.89
The utility of this exception to electronic communications is revealed in R. v.
Sandham.90 All email communications written by accused persons were admitted
for their hearsay use. All of the factual claims they made in their various statements
could therefore be used as proof of those facts.
The Sandham court ruled, appropriately, that the entire email exchange in
which those statements were made, including statements made by other parties to
the email exchange, were also admissible to give context to the comments of the
accused. “As in any conversation, it is essential to hear what both parties are saying
in order to understand the meaning of either side of the conversation.”91 Care is
required however. Typically where the other side of an electronic conversation with
an accused party is admitted, it comes in solely to give context to the statements
made by the accused, and not as evidence in its own right. It would ordinarily be an
error to treat the conversation as evidence of the truth of what other parties to the
conversation have claimed. Exceptionally, however, if it is apparent that the ac-
cused person is adopting as true what another party to the conversation is saying,
the facts that have been adopted as true should be treated as an admission made by
the accused, and therefore as admissible hearsay evidence.
(B) The Business Records Exception
The business records hearsay exceptions are also commonly engaged where
electronic documents are in issue. This is because most business records are now
created and stored electronically. If a record was created in a computer or similar
88 R. v. Evans, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, 1993 CarswellAlta 111, 1993 CarswellAlta 567
(S.C.C.).
89 R. v. Streu, 1989 CarswellAlta 615, 1989 CarswellAlta 514, 70 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
90 Sandham, supra note 59.
91 Ibid. at 34.
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device in the usual and ordinary course of business it will generally be admissible.
In criminal cases two distinct business records exceptions are available.
The most commonly relied upon business records exception is section 30 of
the Canada Evidence Act.92 So long as the notice requirements of this provision are
complied with and proved,93 a record made in the usual and ordinary course of
business by someone under a business duty94 will generally be admissible,95 even
if it contains double hearsay.96 The concept of business is broad. It includes any
calling or undertaking, including any calling or undertaking carried on by govern-
ments and non-profit groups. The records that are generated, including electronic
records, in order to assist in the conduct of that calling or undertaking, will be
admissible as business records. The transaction or event or fact recorded need not
relate to the core business undertaking or calling. It is enough that it is related to
activities connected to the business.97 Nor is there any requirement that the busi-
ness usually keeps records of the kind in question. The exception is generous.
The common law exception for declarations in the course of duty is also avail-
able. It is stricter than section 30 in some respects. It requires that the record in
question be made reasonably contemporaneously to the event, and that it be made
as a matter of duty.98 Although in Ares v. Venner99 the Supreme Court of Canada
held that the recorder had to have personal knowledge, in R. v. Monkhouse the
Court accepted a compiled record of employment made by someone without per-
sonal knowledge where the person originally recording the employment informa-
tion would evidently have been under a business duty as well.100 This is sensible.
92 There are, of course, other statutory exceptions, including section 29 of the Canada
Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, dealing with records of financial institutions.
93 Subsection 30(7) of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 provides for seven
days of notice and an opportunity to inspect the records within five days of receiving
notice of a request to inspect, although these time limits can be abridged by the court.
94 Section 30 does not expressly require that the person making the record be under a duty
to the business to do so. It is an implicit requirement, however, as this is the thing that
provides the most central indicia of reliability: R. v. Wilcox, 2001 CarswellNS 83, 152
C.C.C. (3d) 157 (N.S. C.A).
95 Subsection 30(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, prohibits the admis-
sion of some business records, most importantly, records made of an investigation or
inquiry into an event; records that contravene other rules of admissibility such as privi-
lege or the testimonial incompetence of the maker, and transcripts of evidence.
96 R. v. Martin, 1997 CarswellSask 144, 8 C.R. (5th) 246 (Sask. C.A.). In Paciocco &
Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, supra note 13 at 172, the case is made that unless there
is some other foundation for finding the initial statement to be reliable, double hearsay
should be admitted only if both the recorder and the initial maker of the statement are
under a business duty to ensure the accuracy of the record.
97 See Setak Computer Services Corp. v. Burroughs Business Machines Ltd., 1977 Cars-
wellOnt 626, 15 O.R. (2d) 750 (Ont. H.C.).
98 Ares v. Venner, 1970 CarswellAlta 142, 12 C.R.N.S. 349, 1970 CarswellAlta 80
(S.C.C.).
99 Ares v. Venner, 1970 CarswellAlta 142, 12 C.R.N.S. 349, 1970 CarswellAlta 80
(S.C.C.).
100 R. v. Monkhouse, 1987 CarswellAlta 248, 61 C.R. (3d) 343 (Alta. C.A.).
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Although stricter than the statutory exception, subject to the courts exclusionary
discretion this exception should be available where the notice requirements in sec-
tion 30 of the Canada Evidence Act have not been complied with.101
(C) The Res Gestae Exceptions
The res gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule will also be important for busi-
ness records. Res Gestae is a generic term used to signify that something is part of
the material story or event. Not all res gestae statements are admissible as hearsay.
There are three key hearsay exceptions linked to the res gestae concept, “state-
ments of present physical condition,” “statements of present mental state,” and “ex-
cited utterances.”102 The last two of these exceptions are the most apt to arise
where information technology is being used.
The “statements of present mental state” exception permits hearsay use to be
made of statements made by any person — charged or not — that describe that per-
sons relevant, present mental state of mind (such as emotion, intent, motive, plan),
provided those statements are not made in circumstances of suspicion.103 In R. v. P.
(R.) the Ontario Court of Appeal held that this exception is useful where statements
expressly describe a present state of mind.104 For example, the statement “I am
feeling depressed” is admissible as direct evidence of the speakers depression.
Statements that do not directly assert a state of mind can also be proved pro-
vided they permit a relevant state of mind to be inferred. The conventional view is
that those statements are not hearsay but rather circumstantial evidence, and there-
fore this hearsay exception is not technically required.105 In R. v. Sandham, for
example, the Court admitted email correspondence between two other persons but
found in the home of one of the accused. These emails reflected tension between
the two groups involved in a mass killing. The emails were therefore admissible as
101 Subsection 30(11) provides that the statutory business records exception is in addition
to and not in derogation of any other rule of law that would render a record admissible.
102 The first two exceptions permit the hearsay admission of statements made by individu-
als while experiencing the relevant thing — a physical sensation in the first exception,
and a mental state in the second exception. Since these statements accompany the rele-
vant thing, they are res gestae, or part of the material event, for example, “I have pain
in my head,” or “I intend to go to meet Stan.” Such statements are reliable enough to
admit because the context in which they were made — during the event — permits
their credibility and reliability to be evaluated, and no issues of memory can arise as
the facts narrated are current at the time the statement is made.
103 R. v. Starr, 2000 CarswellMan 450, 2000 CarswellMan 449, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 449
(S.C.C.).
104 R. v. P. (R.), 1990 CarswellOnt 2696, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 334 (Ont. H.C.) [P. (R.)].
105 Personally, I have difficulty with this. Arguably, to serve as circumstantial evidence of
a state of mind a statement must be true. For example, “I do not want to be alone with
Larry” is not circumstantial evidence of fear of Larry unless the speaker truly does not
want to be alone with Larry. Since the statement must be true to be relevant, it is being
proved for a hearsay purpose. This is not a quibble of substance, however. As Justice
Doherty said in R. v. P. (R.), supra note 104, “the result is the same whichever route is
taken.” The statement would come in under this hearsay exception even if the circum-
stantial evidence theory was not available.
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circumstantial evidence that this accused knew of that tension, thereby helping to
fuel his motive to participate in the killing.106
The “excited utterances” exception will often be encountered with electronic
evidence. It is particularly useful where 9-1-1 and other electronically recorded
emergency calls are recorded. So long as the communication is made by a person
who is still under the stress or excitement of a startling event or condition — even
if some time has passed — that communication may be admitted as hearsay if it
describes or comments upon the startling event. In order to be admitted the declar-
ant must be so caught up in the pressure of the event at the time the statement is
made that they would not have time for reflection.107 Often where 9-1-1 calls are
made, this is the case, although this will not invariably be so.108
(e) The Law of Privilege
Naturally some electronic communications are privileged. Not surprisingly,
the law of privilege tends to apply in the same way to electronic communications as
it does to paper communications. In R. v. Docherty,109 for example, the accused
sent an incriminating email to his spouse. He tried to assert spousal privilege over
the document but the court, applying ordinary principles, held that this privilege did
not apply. It is testimonial in nature. It enables spouses to refuse to testify about
their marital communications. It does not protect previously recorded communica-
tions, including emails intended to be confidential.
Still, there is the potential that the law of privilege could be altered radically as
the result of technology. Much of the law of privilege is premised on privacy, yet
privacy as we have known it is under attack by technology. In a world where com-
puter chips with personal information are embedded in passports and enhanced
driver’s licences, where communication using everyday methods of social dis-
course invariably leaves trace evidence, where a message can be disseminated to
thousands simultaneously by private individuals, and where so much of our per-
sonal information is stored in the computer systems of those we interact with, pri-
vacy is becoming harder to maintain. Meanwhile social media users are increas-
106 Sandham, supra note 59. Consistent with the view I express in the preceding footnote,
the Trial Judge described this evidence as coming in under the “state of mind” excep-
tion to the hearsay rule even though the statement was only circumstantial evidence of
a state of mind.
107 Ratten v. R., [1971] 3 All E.R. 801 (Australia P.C.), approved in R. v. F. (G.), 1999
CarswellOnt 129, 132 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Nicholas, 2004 Carswell-
Ont 823, 182 C.C.C. (3d) 393 (Que. C.A.); leave to appeal refused 2004 CarswellOnt
4003, 2004 CarswellOnt 4004 (S.C.C.), where a 9-1-1 call was admitted.
108 In R. v. Pattison, 2011 CarswellBC 3415, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2231 (B.C. S.C.), at paras.
39–41 the accused called 9-1-1 to report the killing and blame others. The call was not
admitted under this exception but did come in as evidence under other rules. Specifi-
cally, since the Crown was relying on Pattison’s callous and calm demeanour after his
arrest as proof of his intention, his anxious emotional behaviour during the 9-1-1 call
became admissible rebuttal evidence.
109 R. v. Docherty, 2010 CarswellOnt 542, [2010] O.J. No. 382 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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ingly apt intentionally to share information with large numbers of select
individuals.
The inability to control the dissemination of information coupled with the
growing sense that individuals should be able to disseminate information quite
broadly but selectively has the potential to alter what our reasonable expectations
of privacy are and this can affect the way the law of privilege operates. It has been
suggested, for example, that the concept of privacy is shifting from “confidential-
ity, anonymity and seclusion” to “informational self-determination.” “In other
words, having greater control over how your personal details are shared with
others, and holding information custodians accountable for what they do with
them.”110 While this can influence what the law of privilege chooses to protect in
the future, it has yet to happen. Courts have, for example, denied privilege claims
relating to Facebook information, even information not generally available through
the public profile that Facebook users post.111 This is an issue that will likely be
revisited as privacy practices within society continue to change.
While the rules of privilege have remained stable in the face of new technol-
ogy, the application of those rules can be affected by the realities of new technol-
ogy. In Eizenstein v. Eizenstein,112 for example, Mr. Eizenstein, a husband engaged
in acrimonious family law litigation, may have secured the assistance of his then
girlfriend in typing and sending email communications to his lawyer as he was not
completely computer literate. Mr. Eizenstein and his girlfriend had a falling out and
the girlfriend sent the emails to Mrs. Eizenstein. Mrs. Eizenstein wanted to use
them during the litigation. Her argument that if her husband shared this information
with his girlfriend the privilege was lost was rejected, even though ordinarily privi-
lege is lost when the information is shared with third parties. The Court took a
pragmatic view, holding that even if Mr. Eizenstein had asked an intimate friend
for assistance in coping with technology in transmitting information, this is the
equivalent of an illiterate person finding help reading a legal document. It would
unfairly defeat access to privilege to find that relying on necessary assistance
would defeat the privilege.
Solicitor-client privilege is an area where new technology could imperil the
privilege. Solicitor-client privilege requires that a privileged communication relates
to the provision of legal services and is made by the client with the intention and in
the reasonable expectation that it will remain private. Yet privacy in its pure sense
is often put at risk or even compromised when new technologies are used by law-
yers. Lawyers are increasingly using the internet to handle client information. Law-
yers working in collaboration on files may use password protected shared files
available through commercial electronic document services. Some lawyers also use
110 Misty Harris, “Privacy becoming scarce in digital world” The Ottawa Citizen, (2 April
2012) at A4.
111 See, for example, Frangione v. Vandongen, 2010 CarswellOnt 5639, [2010] O.J. No.
2337 (Ont. Master), Sparks v. Dubé, 2011 CarswellNB 80, [2011] N.B.J. No. 38 (N.B.
Q.B.); Bishop (Litigation Guardian of) v. Minichiello, 2009 CarswellBC 871, [2009]
B.C.J. No. 692 (B.C. S.C.); leave to appeal refused 2009 CarswellBC 3301 (B.C. C.A.
[In Chambers])
112 Eizenstein v. Eizenstein, 2008 CarswellOnt 3822, [2008] O.J. No. 2600 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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“SaaS Enterprise platforms” such as CLIO to manage their documents and practice
systems. Many are using “cloud computing” in their offices in which data is stored
remotely and routed using the facilities and soft-ware of web-based service provid-
ers. Hotmail, Gmail, and Yahoo employ cloud computing for email messages.
While the lawyer is the data controller who in-puts and directs the dissemination of
data in cloud computing systems, information input into these systems falls outside
of the immediate control of the lawyer. Arguably the information is typically safer
“in the cloud” than it is in a law office given the availability of encryption and the
security policies of cloud providers but the fact is the lawyer who uses cloud com-
puting forfeits autonomous control over the information and has intentionally relin-
quished it in order to use the service. Often the web-based service provider, the
data processor, is even located outside of Canada where Canadian law does not
apply.
What does this mean for the integrity of solicitor-client privilege? I agree with
the sentiments expressed by Trent Skanes. “The test for communications ‘made in
confidence’ [that is used to identify solicitor-client privilege] needs to have broad
application to be effective.”113 As technology advances the standard for finding
communications to have been made in confidence must be flexible enough to apply
in all mediums and situations. Judges need to ensure that their privilege-based deci-
sions reflect the realities of document management in a technological age. Failing
this, the function of solicitor-client privilege in encouraging the candid exchange of
information will be defeated.
A related issue arises with respect to unintentional disclosure of privileged
information. The opportunity for the accidental transmission of privileged informa-
tion has increased dramatically with the internet and with electronic discovery, dis-
closure, and file management. In a case I was involved in, the disclosed CD ROM
containing the Crown file inadvertently included the Crown’s litigation privileged
research memoranda as well as solicitor-client communications with investiga-
tors.114 In addition, “metadata” including information deleted from earlier genera-
tions of documents can easily be revealed using ordinary computer programs unless
it is “scrubbed” before electronic documents are disseminated.
Historically, the law of privilege was harsh when privileged information had
been accidentally disclosed. The privilege was lost. This unremitting approach no
longer applies. Courts asked to enforce privilege involving inadvertently disclosed
information are now making discretionary determinations about whether inadver-
tent disclosure defeats a privilege claim.115 There have even been civil cases where
lawyers inadvertently receiving solicitor-client information have been removed
113 Trent Skanes, student-at-law, Memorandum to Professor Adam Dodek, Faculty of
Law, University of Ottawa, Re: SCP and Technology, 14 June 2011 at 9. I have benefi-
ted tremendously in this privilege section from Mr. Skanes’ paper, from its research,
and in identifying issues of concern as well as gaining an understanding of relevant
technology.
114 The CD was returned unread but had it been retained, complex litigation could have
resulted over its status.
115 Airst v. Airst, 1998 CarswellOnt 2630, [1998] O.J. No. 2615 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
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from a case.116 Courts making discretionary decisions about whether privilege will
be protected over inadvertently disclosed information will consider the intensity of
the legal policy underlying the privilege (with solicitor-client privilege being par-
ticularly jealously guarded) how the document came to be released (with miscon-
duct by the party gaining possession playing a large role in supporting continued
privilege and carelessness in disclosure weakening the claim), how prompt the ef-
forts to gain its return were, how widely the privileged information has come to be
disseminated, and how important and necessary the information is to the party who
inadvertently received it.117 In criminal cases, the principles of full answer and de-
fence and the presumption of innocence would assist in supporting the use of other-
wise privileged information that could be important in the defence of a case, even,
arguably, where the information falls short of satisfying the “innocence at stake”
standards that courts would otherwise insist upon before disregarding privileges.118
(f) Exclusionary and Procedural Discretion
(i) The Range of Discretionary Authority
Courts in the modern era have potent authority to make discretionary, context-
based procedural decisions to assist in the sensible application of technological
evidence.
While there is no “inclusionary” discretion, the discretionary authority of
courts includes the power to exclude technically admissible evidence. It is now
widely understood that this discretion applies to any kind of evidence. The formula
that applies to the exclusionary discretion is familiar to all jurists and involves bal-
ancing the probative value of the evidence against the prejudice its admission could
cause. “Probative value” describes the contribution the evidence could make to the
case, and includes an evaluation of how important the issue the evidence addresses
is, how compelling the evidence is in resolving that issue, and the credibility and
reliability of the evidence. “Prejudice” describes all of the adverse costs involved in
admitting the evidence, including (1) the adverse costs to parties and witnesses
such as the degree of embarrassment it will cause or the extent of any privacy inva-
sion its presentation entails, (2) the adverse practical implications for the trial in
calling the evidence including the undue consumption of time or distraction from
the issues at hand, and even (3) prejudice to the administration of justice, such as
the degree to which the evidence may be inflammatory or potentially distorting in
its impact, as well as the prospect that admitting it could discourage future criminal
complaints.119
116 Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition Corp., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 189, 2006 Cars-
wellOnt 4623, 2006 CarswellOnt 4624 (S.C.C.).
117 See Metcalfe v. Metcalfe, 2001 CarswellMan 104, 198 D.L.R. (4th) 318 (Man. C.A.).
118 See R. v. Brown, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 185, 2002 CarswellOnt 916, 2002 CarswellOnt 917
(S.C.C.), where the “McLure test” that applies for court-based applications to dismantle
privilege is most fully explained.
119 The law relating to the exclusionary discretion is described in detail in Paciocco &
Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, supra note 13 at 34–42, including the controversial
authority to evaluate credibility and reliability at the admissibility stage.
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Once these factors are evaluated a simple balancing is undertaken. With re-
spect to Crown evidence the formula for exclusion is simple. Does the prejudice in
admitting the evidence outweigh its probative value? When the evidence in ques-
tion is being presented by the accused person the exclusionary discretion is to be
used more circumspectly. In the interests of full answer and defence it should be
excluded only if the prejudicial effect of the questioning substantially outweighs its
probative value.120
There are fixed rules of evidence that incorporate a similar balancing exercise.
The admissibility of similar fact evidence, expert evidence, and even hearsay evi-
dence applying the principled exception invite assessments of probative value and
prejudice.
There is also the discretion that judges have to manage the trial. Appellate
Courts have come to recognize that given the complexity of first instance trials in a
Charter era this power includes not only the traditional authority to control the
admissibility of evidence, but also such things as “the power to place reasonable
limits on oral submissions, to direct that submissions be made in writing, to require
an offer of proof before embarking on a lengthy voir dire, to defer rulings, to direct
the manner in which a voir dire is conducted (especially whether to do so on the
basis of testimony or in some other form) and exceptionally to direct the order in
which evidence is called.”121 In R. v. Hamilton the Ontario Court of Appeal re-
cently added the following remarks:122
A trial judge may properly intervene to focus the evidence on the matters in
issue, to clarify evidence, to avoid irrelevant and repetitive evidence, to dis-
pense with proof of obvious and agreed matters, and to ensure that the way
a witness is answering questions does not unduly hamper the progress of the
trial.
At a time when we are concerned about the increasing cost and length of
criminal trials as well as their drain on resources and the pressures they may
bring to bear on the administration of justice, appropriate trial management
is to be encouraged, not muted.
These discretionary powers that judges have over admissibility and process
are tremendously important in coping with technological evidence.
(ii) Character Evidence and the exclusionary discretion
Information posted by someone on social media can disclose a tremendous
amount about their character. That is why potential employers consult it when they
can. Social media postings as well as emails and texts, which are used in notori-
ously less discrete ways than paper correspondence or even face-to-face conversa-
tions, can provide a treasure trove of information useful in discrediting witnesses
by exposing their general character or proving character where character is
relevant.
120 R. v. Seaboyer, 1991 CarswellOnt 1022, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, 1991 CarswellOnt 109
(S.C.C.) [Seaboyer].
121 R. v. Felderhof, 2003 CarswellOnt 4943, [2003] O.J. No. 4819 (Ont. C.A.)
122 Hamilton, supra note 4.
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Defence lawyers therefore often search the public Facebook sites of complain-
ants and important witnesses for data. Some seek out “friends” willing to share
access to non-public postings. When this does not work they may have someone
contact the complainant or witness electronically to ask to be added as a “friend.” It
is not uncommon for this ruse to work. Many people are garrulous when it comes
to social media.
Social practices surrounding social media can therefore result in the discovery
of a rich catalogue of relevant information. It can also lead to the production and
potential presentation at trial of an array of tangential, time consuming or poin-
tlessly embarrassing information.
The general exclusionary discretion gives the courts the tools to deal with this,
particularly where this information is used to discredit a witness. The virtue in us-
ing a discretionary approach rather than to prohibit uninvited access to social media
absolutely is that this practice of scouring Facebook and social media has, in some
cases, produced extremely probative information. Social media postings can be im-
portant in child protection cases,123 and in access cases.124 They can also produce
information with specific relevance to the case. In R. v. De Finney Facebook was
used by a victim to identify her assailant125 and in R. v. B.B. Facebook postings
were useful in demonstrating the animus the complainant had against the ac-
cused.126 Where social media information is most apt to be used, however, is in
discrediting witnesses on the basis of their character.
Ordinarily character evidence of this kind is presented during cross-examina-
tion. This kind of information is used to confront the witness with their discredita-
ble conduct, associations or lifestyle. On its face the law of evidence has been gen-
erous in permitting lawyers to cross-examine opposing witnesses other than
accused persons using this kind of information. It has historically been considered
relevant in showing a court the kind of person they are being asked to believe. Still,
discreditable conduct questioning has never been without its limits. Judges have
long recognized the discretion to prevent or abridge cross-examination that is irrel-
evant, prolix or insulting.127 The legal test for exercising that discretion is now
clearly defined. Courts simply apply the formula used in the general discretion to
exclude evidence — probative value balanced against prejudice. If the line of ques-
tioning is prejudicial and not probative enough, it can be easily controlled.
123 See Children’s Aid Society of Northumberland v. T. (H.), 2009 CarswellOnt 23, [2009]
O.J. No. 15 (Ont. S.C.J.); affirmed 2011 CarswellOnt 213 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
124 See, for example, R. (A.) v. R. (A.M.), 2009 CarswellAlta 1965, [2009] A.J. No. 1332
(Alta. Q.B.).
125 R. v. De Finney, 2011 CarswellOnt 12057, [2011] O.J. No. 4926 (Ont. C.J.).
126 See R. v. Bryan, 2011 CarswellOnt 3359, [2011] O.J. No. 2204 (Ont. S.C.J.) and see R.
v. Rowe, 2010 CarswellNfld 441, [2010] N.J. No. 442 (N.L. Prov. Ct.).
127 R. v. Anderson, 1938 CarswellMan 23, 70 C.C.C. 275 (Man. C.A.).
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Here are some key questions the trial judge might pose in deciding whether to
permit cross-examination on character information derived from social media:
(1) Probative Value — the materiality of the evidence (How important is
the issue the evidence addresses?)
a. First, judges need to ensure that the stated purpose for which
the evidence is offered is genuine. They therefore need to iden-
tify the actual purpose the evidence is apt to serve. For exam-
ple, evidence offered as a basis for discrediting a testifying sex-
ual assault complainant that discloses the complainants
attitudes about dress or sexuality are apt, in substance, to be
about sexual reputation or to invite the prohibited twin myth
inferences identified in R. v. Seaboyer,128 and should generally
not be allowed.
b. Second, where evidence is directed at the credibility of a wit-
ness, judges need to evaluate how important the credibility of
that witness is by examining how central or important the testi-
mony of the witness is.
(2) Probative Value — the influence of the evidence (How compelling is
the evidence in resolving the issue it addresses?)
c. Judges need to evaluate the impact the information could
have on the credibility of the witness, even if true. Can the sub-
ject of inquiry truly have a material impact on the readiness of
the court to believe the witness? The greater the prospect that it
will, the more probative the evidence is.
(3) Probative Value — the credibility and reliability of the evidence (Is
the information the questioning is based upon compelling enough to war-
rant exploration?)
d. Is there a realistic foundation for believing the information
being relied upon by the cross-examiner could be true? If the
foundation for the line of questioning appears to lay in internet
gossip there may not be a sufficient “good faith” foundation for
the questioning to satisfy the requirements of R. v. Lyttle.129
Counsel should not make suggestions unless they have a good
faith basis for believing that those suggestions bear a reasona-
ble likelihood of accuracy. Where no good faith basis is appar-
ent, courts are free to ask counsel to make their foundation
clear.130 Even if there is a good faith basis, the exclusionary
discretion still permits the exclusion of unreliable information.
Great care should be exercised before cutting off lines of in-
128 Seaboyer, supra note 120.
129 R. v. Lyttle, 2004 CarswellOnt 511, 2004 CarswellOnt 510, 180 C.C.C. (3d) 476
(S.C.C.).
130 Ibid. at para. 52.
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quiry, particularly inquiries undertaken by or on behalf of ac-
cused persons.
(4) Prejudice — adverse consequences to parties and witnesses
e. Does the manner in which the information was obtained con-
stitute an inappropriate violation of the privacy interests of the
witness or complainant? Where the authorities are involved in
securing non-public information from social media the Charter
may be implicated. Even where the Charter does not apply, a
consideration in permitting the line of inquiry is the fairness of
the manner in which the evidence was secured. Subterfuge to
gain access to information not publicly shared is a factor that
could support an exclusionary decision;
f. Is the information itself embarrassing or damaging to the rep-
utation of the witness? If so, consideration has to be undertaken
as to whether the information is probative enough to warrant
this result.
(5) Prejudice — adverse practical implications
g. Will the presentation of the information be time-consuming
or distracting or open collateral issues that may require explora-
tion? If so, is the information probative enough to warrant the
inquiry?
(6) Prejudice — prejudice to the administration of justice
h. Does the information exploit prejudicial stereotypes, or is it
inflammatory enough to provoke a more emotional than ra-
tional reaction?
i. Is the information complex enough that it could confuse the
decision?
j. Is the information apt, given its nature, to discourage future
complaints to the criminal justice system from being made, or
to damage socially useful activities such as counselling and
therapy from being undertaken?
If the questioning is permitted and the witness denies suggestions made about
their discreditable character, the “collateral facts” rule is engaged. This is because
the “character” of a witness is generally considered to be a collateral fact. It is “not
relevant to matters which must be proved for the determination of the case.”131 If
strictly applied the collateral facts rule would mean that while counsel can use in-
formation derived from Facebook and other electronic media that reflects adversely
on the character of a witness in order to frame the questions asked, if the witness
denies the suggestion, that denial cannot be challenged. If the collateral facts rule is
applied with full vigour, the cross-examiner cannot simply take a print-out of the
Facebook page and thrust it before the witness in an effort to prove the allegation
and thereby contradict the witness.
131 R. v. Krause, 1986 CarswellBC 761, 1986 CarswellBC 330, 54 C.R. (3d) 294 at 301
(S.C.C.).
224   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [11 C.J.L.T.]
The precise definition of a collateral fact is, however, a matter of controversy.
In practice courts tend to exercise discretion whether to permit a witness’s answers
to be contradicted. Again, if the exercise could be a productive one in exposing
relevant information about the credibility or reliability of the witness, courts may
permit the contradiction evidence to be used, particularly where the accused person
is the one seeking to lead the evidence.132
(iii) Demonstrative Evidence
Computer graphics and animation can make a significant contribution to the
presentation of evidence in courtrooms. They can be used to assist in demonstrating
what the evidence purports to show. These graphics and animations are not evi-
dence, per se. They are instead, “testimonial aids.”
The admission of computer graphics, such as computer-generated charts and
graphs, is simple. They are nothing more than mundane examples of demonstrative
evidence operating in much the same way poster-board graphs and charts or three-
dimensional anatomical models do. The foundational question for determining their
admission is whether the chart or diagram would assist the trier of fact in under-
standing the evidence. This inquiry includes an evaluation of whether the graphic is
presented in a misleading manner. If so, the trial judge has the discretion to exclude
the visual aid as too prejudicial to the administration of justice to admit. For exam-
ple, a graph purporting to plot subjects having values of 103, 107, 102 and 109
would be misleading if it began with a baseline of 100. The visual image would
suggest differences of 10 to 60 per cent when the actual differences are a fraction of
that.
Computer animations involving moving objects can also be powerful litigation
aids. Probably because of their production costs they are uncommonly used in Ca-
nadian courts. The most famous Canadian illustration, R. v. Suzack,133 involved the
use of computers to demonstrate the trajectory of bullets, something that can be
testified to but is difficult to picture without such assistance. This kind of evidence
is more dangerous than stationary computer graphics because it can overwhelm the
testimony that it is supposed to aid, particularly where full computer animation pur-
ports to constitute the recreation of events. It therefore has to be treated as a video
re-enactment would. The probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence
must be closely scrutinized, with probative value being linked inextricably with
accuracy.134 If it is based on disputed facts or purports to depict events that are too
complex and dynamic to permit fair reproduction it may not be probative enough to
132 See David M Paciocco, “Using Collateral Facts with Discretion” (2002) 46 Crim LQ
160.
133 R. v. Suzack, [1995] O.J. No. 4237, 1995 CarswellOnt 1350 (Ont. Gen. Div.); affirmed
2000 CarswellOnt 95 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused 2001 CarswellOnt 1076,
2001 CarswellOnt 1075 (S.C.C.).
134 See R. v. MacDonald, 2000 CarswellOnt 2416, 146 C.C.C. (3d) 525 (Ont. C.A.) for an
example of these principles applied to a physical as opposed to computer-generated re-
enactment.
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admit.135 Moreover, since it is the product of computer generation, the images
shown require authentication. The computer programmer may have to be called to
explain the process of preparing the simulation and to identify its shortcomings.136
(iv) Visual Presentation Aids
Computer presentation tools can provide clarity and emphasis not only during
argument but also during the presentation of evidence. It is now common for prose-
cutors to present identification evidence in electronic format, and many courtrooms
are now wired. R. v. MacKay137 was an early case dealing with this kind of prac-
tice, decided only a decade ago. The Court engaged in a careful evaluation of the
costs and benefits involved in permitting the Crown to present its photographic
evidence using a computer program that could enhance viewing. Of concern to the
defence was that only the Crown had access to this technology. The Crown agreed,
however, to make available a technology expert to assist the accused when it used
the photographs, ameliorating this unfairness. The Trial Judge ensured that the use
of the technology was fair and ordered that it could be used as requested. The deci-
sion effectively involved the discretion the judge had in trial management, in-
formed by the familiar probative value, prejudice inquiry.
The same holds true with PowerPoint and other visual presentation aids. Most
often such tools are used by experts to assist in presenting their evidence. This is
not always so. In R. v. Hamilton,138 for example, PowerPoint was used by a police
witness in explaining the location, timing and pattern of telephone calls between
those alleged to have been involved in a robbery, after the supporting background
testimony had been provided by representatives from the relevant cell phone ser-
vice providers. This assisted the Ontario Court of Appeal in rejecting an appeal that
the evidence should not have been admitted without a voir dire. The Court de-
scribed the cell phone evidence as factual and not opinion evidence, saying this: 
Additionally, the jury would have had no difficulty in understanding the cell
phone location evidence, especially after it was summarized in a
PowerPoint presentation. That presentation undoubtedly clarified the evi-
dence and put to rest any possibility the jury might have been confused by
it. The presentation of the cell phone evidence did take a fair amount of
time, seven days. But in the context of a four-month trial, this was not an
overly long amount of time.139
In the May 2009 trial of Ottawa Mayor, Larry O’Brien, defence counsel used
PowerPoint effectively to project the documents and media reports it was using to
cross-examine the key Crown witness. Contradictions were displayed for the judge
and witness to see. This was not done simply to increase the impact of the exercise
135 See Green v. Lawrence, 1996 CarswellMan 217, 109 Man. R. (2d) 168 (Man. Q.B.)
where the computer program created an unfair impression of the relative size and
strength of the combatants.
136 See Owens (Litigation Guardian of) v. Grandell, 1994 CarswellOnt 3918, [1994] O.J.
No. 496 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
137 R. v. MacKay, 2002 CarswellSask 490, [2002] S. J. No. 459 (Sask. Q.B.).
138 Hamilton, supra note 4.
139 Ibid. at para. 282.
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for the judge. Having a highly visible display of the relevant passages ensured that
the line of questioning could be easily followed and arguably had some psychologi-
cal impact on the witness during cross-examination, given that his prior comments
were so tangibly presented. Courts, exercising their discretion to control the pro-
cess, clearly have the discretion to allow or refuse this kind of tactic, after evaluat-
ing its utility and its costs.
II. CONCLUSION
As can be seen, for the most part the laws of evidence are suitable without
radical transformation to cope with new technologies. While their application can
be affected when challenged with technological evidence, the rules themselves re-
main familiar. The following propositions can assist in simplifying the law of evi-
dence as it applies to new technologies:
(a) Limits on Expert Evidence
(1) Not all technology needs to be explained by expert witnesses. Expert evi-
dence rules apply solely to “special skill or knowledge,” or skill or knowledge that
is exclusive or unique rather than held by many members of the public. Similarly,
the expert evidence rules apply only if that special skill or knowledge is “beyond
the ken of ordinary people.” Lay witnesses can therefore offer evidence about the
mundane operation of technologies commonly used by ordinary people, such as
social media programs, smart phones or commercially available computer software.
(b) Judicial Notice
(2) Courts should take a functional approach to judicial notice that will permit
them to cope with technology that is broadly relied upon by ordinary persons. This
includes accepting, without the need for proof, the capabilities and operation of
new technologies that are broadly used or understood by members of the public.
(c) Electronic Records, Authentication and the Best Evidence Rule
(3) As a general rule, the party presenting an electronic document is required
to furnish an evidentiary foundation capable of supporting a finding that the elec-
tronic document is that which it is purported to be, coupled with compliance with
the “best evidence” requirements described in propositions 9 and 10 below.
(4) Where such evidence has been presented, a factual controversy about the
whether the document is genuine in its entirety is best resolved at the end of the
case as a matter of fact rather than as a question of admissibility.
(5) The same holds true where there is a contest over whether the electronic
document may have been altered, such as a doctored email. This is ordinarily a
matter of weight and not admissibility.
(6) While the continuity of the condition of an exhibit is not ordinarily a pre-
condition to its admissibility, if there is no witness who can verify the authenticity
of an electronically recorded document with direct testimony, those documents may
have to be authenticated as a matter of fact by showing the continuity of their chain
of custody from recording, to storing, to retrieval from a computer system. The way
this is done is to demonstrate that the electronic document system was functioning
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properly, which can be achieved using the “best evidence” requirements described
in propositions 9 and 10 below.
(7) Exceptionally, the continuity of the condition of electronically recorded
photographs, videotapes and audiotapes must be demonstrated before they are ad-
missible. As artificial reproductions of actual images or sounds, their authenticity
depends on their accurate representation of what they purport to depict. Accord-
ingly, the party offering the electronically recorded photographs, videotapes or
audiotapes must present evidence capable of showing that the photograph, video-
tape or audiotape remains an accurate and fair reproduction of the thing it purports
to recreate.
(8) There is a distinction between authenticity and the accuracy of the contents
of the documents. If the document is authenticated, it is admissible even though
some of the information that was input into the document may be inaccurate. The
proper way to deal with the risk of inaccuracy is to bear it in mind when ultimately
deciding what weight to give to the evidence in question. This proposition is partic-
ularly important for time and date stamps generated by computer. Their potential
imprecision should not affect the admissibility of the relevant electronic document,
but care must be taken when relying on the time and date stamps.
(9) The statutory best evidence rules applicable to electronic documents, in-
cluding digitized audiotapes, photographs and videotapes are easily met, subject to
rebuttal, by:
a. The evidence of witnesses who can testify directly to the accuracy of
the document, including audiotapes, photographs and videotapes; or
b. The evidence of witnesses that they sent or received a relevant and
coherent electronic document as an email, text message or attachment by
cellphone or computer system, or that they successfully downloaded a
responsive and coherent document after putting appropriate commands
into a search engine; or
c. Evidence that the electronic document was recorded or stored in a
computer system belonging to the opposing party litigant; or
d. Evidence that the electronic document was recorded or stored in the
usual and ordinary course of business independently by a person who is
not a party to the litigation.
(10) The statutory best evidence rules that apply to electronic documents can
alternatively be complied with by proving, subject to rebuttal, that:
a. the relevant document was signed with a “secure electronic signature”
or
b. by using a print out of an electronic document where the printout has
been manifestly or consistently acted on, relied on, or used as a record of
the information recorded or stored in the print out.
(d) The Law of Hearsay
(11) Computer Generated Information consisting of data created by a com-
puter system is not hearsay even when offered to prove the facts it asserts. Admissi-
bility depends on its reliability which can be established by expert evidence, or in
appropriate cases, by taking judicial notice.
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(12) Electronic documents which contain statements of fact may nonetheless
be admitted without hearsay exception if, by their nature, they lead to relevant cir-
cumstantial inferences, for example, airline tickets or proof of the use of bar coded
frequency identification tags linked to individuals.
(13) The most commonly relevant hearsay exceptions apart from the princi-
pled exception include admissions by opposing party litigants, the business records
exceptions to the hearsay rule, and the res gestae exception — most notably the
“statement of present mental state exception” and the “excited utterance excep-
tion.” The latter exception is useful in admitting 9-1-1 calls as evidence of the truth
of the facts claimed during the 9-1-1 call.
(e) The Law of Privilege
(14) The law of privilege has yet to change even though new conceptions of
privacy are developing as the result of new technologies. Courts nonetheless need
to apply the existing rules with sensitivity to their underlying purpose so that re-
duced opportunities for privacy or the increased risk of unintentional disclosure do
not defeat the policy objectives protected by the privileges in question. This is par-
ticularly so with solicitor-client privilege.
(f) Exclusionary and Procedural Discretion
(15) Courts can make profitable use of the exclusionary discretion in control-
ling the abusive or unproductive use of information secured from social media sites
and other electronic databanks by excluding evidence whose probative value is out-
weighed by its prejudice. Probative value includes an assessment of how important
the issue being address with that evidence is to the case, how informative the evi-
dence is on that issue, and the credibility and reliability of the information.
Prejudice includes the adverse consequences receiving the evidence would have for
the parties and witnesses, the adverse practical effects of admission on the effi-
ciency of the trial process, and prejudice to the administration of justice including
misleading the decision-maker or discouraging future co-operation with the crimi-
nal justice system. A higher degree of prejudice is required to exclude defence
evidence.
(16) Courts can make profitable use of their discretion to ensure that demon-
strative evidence is used fairly, in a probative and productive way.
(17) Courts should exercise their discretion to control the manner in which
evidence is presented to ensure that technological aids to the presentation of evi-
dence, such as PowerPoint, are used appropriately.
None of this is radical surgery. All of it is entirely doable. The law is well
equipped for coping with the law of evidence in a technological age. 
